University of Dayton

eCommons
School of Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

Spring 2006

State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic Espionage
Act
Susan W. Brenner
University of Dayton, susanwbrenner@yahoo.com

Anthony C. Crescenzi

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub
Part of the National Security Law Commons

eCommons Citation
Brenner, Susan W. and Crescenzi, Anthony C., "State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic
Espionage Act" (2006). School of Law Faculty Publications. 104.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub/104

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in School of Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

BRENNER FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS

3/21/2006 11:29 AM

STATE-SPONSORED CRIME: THE FUTILITY
OF THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT
Susan W. Brenner* and Anthony C. Crescenzi**
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 390
II. THE PROBLEM ................................................................... 392
A. State-Sponsored Economic Espionage ...................... 393
B. Economic Espionage and the Internet ...................... 395
C. Economic Espionage: The Usual Suspects? .............. 398
1. France ................................................................... 401
2. Russia.................................................................... 403
3. Japan .................................................................... 405
4. China..................................................................... 407
5. Germany................................................................ 409
6. Israel ..................................................................... 410
7. South Korea .......................................................... 412
D. Business/Competitive Espionage.............................. 413
E. Scope of the Problem.................................................. 415
F. Criminal Espionage................................................... 417
III. THE LAW: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT (EEA).................. 419
A. Provisions ................................................................... 419
1. Trade Secret .......................................................... 421
2. Offenses ................................................................. 424
B. Enforcement ............................................................... 430
1. Systemic Factors ................................................... 431
2. Context .................................................................. 440

*NCR Distinguished Professor of Law & Technology, University of Dayton School of Law
**CISSP & Principal Information Analyst, Dolphin Technology, Inc.

389

BRENNER FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS

390

3/21/2006 11:29 AM

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:2

IV. THE FUTURE ..................................................................... 452
A. Improved Reaction ..................................................... 453
B. Prevention .................................................................. 455
1. Implementation Strategies ................................... 456
2. Liability................................................................. 457
C. Sum ............................................................................ 464

I.

INTRODUCTION

Economic espionage and trade secret theft threaten our
1
Nation’s national security and economic well-being.
The United States is facing an international challenge:
economic espionage, the theft of our intellectual assets and
2
proprietary information. The events of September 11, 2001
pushed the seriousness of this activity to the far recesses of the
public’s consciousness. While this threat to our national security
lacks the visceral impact of September 11th, the long term
national security implications (a decline in economic
competitiveness) stemming from the systemic theft of
intellectual property has consequences no less serious than a
1. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034
(statement by President William J. Clinton upon signing H.R. 3723).
2. This Article adopts the definition of “economic espionage” included in the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, i.e., economic espionage consists of misappropriating
trade secrets belonging to citizens of one country in order to benefit another country. See
infra subpart III.A.2 (discussing the §1831 offense). The definition used in this Article is
in one sense more generic than that incorporated in the Economic Espionage Act. The
Act differentiates between the theft of trade secrets, which is carried out without the
intent to benefit a foreign sovereign, and economic espionage. See infra subpart III.A.2.
Those who steal trade secrets are prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832, while those who
engage in economic espionage are prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1831. See infra subpart
III.A.2. For various reasons, foreign nationals who steal trade secrets belonging to U.S.
citizens, presumably for the benefit of their own countries, are often prosecuted under 18
U.S.C. § 1832. See discussion infra subpart III.B.1. The definition of economic espionage
used in this Article is not predicated on the offense charged. It looks to the nature of the
conduct at issue and would, therefore, encompass instances in which those prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1832 actually engaged in economic espionage, i.e., actually acted to
benefit a foreign sovereign. The broader definition is necessary to implement the
Article’s focus on economic espionage as a unique type of criminal activity.
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real-world terrorist attack. Espionage targeting intellectual
assets and proprietary information is driven by the
3
international competition characterizing a global economy.
Americans have long ignored the preeminent rule of
international economic competition: “Expediency outgrosses
4
morality.” The success or failure of our ability to compete will
determine U.S. economic well-being and, ultimately, our
national security. The global economy that emerged after the
Cold War is replete with strong, independent, predatory
competitors, a state of affairs that can be attributed largely to
U.S. economic globalism and the showcasing of American
5
technology. The desire for American technology is the primary
motivation for the continuing economic espionage activities
undertaken by a multitude of foreign countries.
It has been obvious for over a decade that economic
6
espionage is a serious problem. Appreciating the seriousness of
this threat, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act of
7
1996; the President signed the Act into law on October 11, 1996.
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) took a traditional approach
to the activity at issue by treating the misappropriation of
8
proprietary economic information as theft and criminalizing it.
Congress believed that by prosecuting and sanctioning those
who unlawfully appropriate proprietary information, we can
9
deter others from engaging in such conduct.
3. J. Thompson Strong, Tilting with Machiavelli: Fighting Competitive Espionage
in the 1990s, 7 INT’L J. OF INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (NO. 2) 161, 162
(1994).
4. Id. at 161–62.
5. William T. Warner, International Technology Transfer and Economic Espionage,
7 INT’L J. OF INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 143, 143–44 (1994).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The end of the
Cold War sent government spies scurrying to the private sector to perform illicit work for
businesses and corporations . . . and by 1996 . . . nearly $24 billion of corporate
intellectual property was being stolen each year.”).
7. See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d at 194–95.
8. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 11, 110 Stat.
3488, § 1831 (1996).
9. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 11 (1996). As stated in the report, “Only by
adopting a national scheme to protect U.S. proprietary economic information can we
hope to maintain our industrial and economic edge and thus safeguard our national
security. Foremost, we believe that the greatest benefit of the Federal statute will be as a
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Prosecution and punishment can contribute to preventing
economic espionage, but they, alone, cannot accomplish this, for
reasons we explain below. Our purpose in writing this Article is
to point out the danger of relying on traditional solutions in a
nontraditional era; reacting to completed acts of economic
espionage by sanctioning the perpetrator(s) is an effective
strategy only if they can be identified, located, and apprehended.
Part II explains what economic espionage is and why it is a
serious problem. Part III reviews the provisions and
enforcement of the Economic Espionage Act and explains why it
is not a viable approach to economic espionage in the twentyfirst century. Part IV considers how we can more effectively
address economic espionage.
II.

THE PROBLEM

This Part outlines the problems we face from economic
espionage. As subpart II.A notes, trade secrets, which are at the
heart of economic espionage, extend beyond classified military
information and technologies into a world in which information
has become our most important asset. subpart II.B describes
how cyberspace has altered the traditional dynamic involved in
economic espionage; the Internet has erased significant
financing, proximity, scale, and physical constraints while at the
same time protecting an attacker’s identity and reducing risk.
subpart II.C explains that economic espionage has become a
worldwide threat, with a long list of “usual suspects.” Subpart
II.D notes that economic espionage can yield significant business
and competitive advantages and explains that an understanding
of these advantages is necessary to understand the legal and
illegal practices of information gathering. Finally, subpart II.E
reviews the overall scope of the problem, while subpart II.F.
focuses on hacker tools and the logistical methods of present day
economic espionage.

powerful deterrent.” Id.
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A. State-Sponsored Economic Espionage
[S]ome foreign countries, including the major
players, . . . continued to employ state actors—including
their intelligence services—as well as commercial
enterprises, particularly when seeking the most
10
sensitive and difficult to acquire technologies.
The critical element of the EEA, which is analyzed in Part
III, infra, is the involvement of foreign governments, their
agents, or instrumentalities deriving benefits from the
acquisition of a nation’s trade secrets. U.S. expenditures on
research and development initiatives are in excess of two
hundred billion dollars annually and are the largest by far of
any developed country. This fact, together with the reality that
economic competition is an immutable aspect of international
relations, makes the United States a target rich environment for
economic espionage activity. The critical issue this Article
highlights is the fact that espionage is much broader than
efforts by traditional adversaries to avail themselves of strictly
classified military information. The current threat is posed by
traditional and nontraditional adversaries. This threat is
directed at the spectrum of proprietary and military
technologies that have traditionally provided the United States
with a qualitative economic and military advantage. These
advantages translate directly to the economic and military
strength that has enabled the United States to attain its current
status as the world’s only true super-power.
The EEA resulted from Congress’ recognizing that foreign
elements were engaging in active and on-going economic
11
espionage operations. These activities are designed to exploit

10. OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—2004 ix–x
(2004),
http://www.nacic.gov/publications/reports_speeches/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2004/
FecieAnnual report_2004_NoCoverPages.pdf [hereinafter ONCIX 2004 REPORT].
11. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12207-08 (1996). Senator Specter stated:
In an increasingly complex and competitive economic world, intellectual
property forms a critical component of our economy. As traditional industries
shift to low-wage producers in developing countries, our economic edge
depends to an ever-increasing degree on the ability of our businesses and
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the benefits of U.S. research and development without
expending the financial capital necessary to develop indigenous
technologies or trade secrets. In today’s world, a nation’s
12
economic viability is the true measure of its power. Military
strength is contingent upon an economy’s ability to integrate
technological advancements having dual use (commercial and
military) applications.

inventors to stay one step ahead of those in other countries. And American
business and inventors have been extremely successful and creative in
developing intellectual property and trade secrets. America leads the
nation’s [sic] of the world in developing new products and new technologies.
Millions of jobs depend on the continuation of the productive minds of
Americans, both native born and immigrants who find the freedom here to
try new ideas and add to our economic strength. Inventing new and better
technologies, production methods, and the like, can be expensive. American
companies and the U.S. Government spend billions on research and
development. The benefits reaped from these expenditures can easily come to
nothing, however, if a competitor can simply steal the trade secret without
expending the development costs. While prices may be reduced, ultimately
the incentives for new invention disappear, along with jobs, capital
investment, and everything else that keeps our economy strong. For years
now, there has been mounting evidence that many foreign nations and their
corporations have been seeking to gain competitive advantage by stealing
the trade secrets, the intangible intellectual property of inventors in this
country. The Intelligence Committee has been aware that since the end of
the cold war [sic], foreign nations have increasingly put their espionage
resources to work trying to steal American economic secrets. Estimates of
the loss to U.S. business from the theft of intangible intellectual property
exceed $100 billion. The loss in U.S. jobs is incalculable.
Id.
12. Thierry Oliver Desmet, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: Are We Finally
Taking Corporate Spies Seriously?, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 93, 96–97 (1999).
Since the end of the Cold War, the focus of intelligence and
counterintelligence efforts has shifted from military and political targets to
technological and economic ones. Nations have been reshaping their
intelligence agencies and investigative resources to be more responsive to the
competitive and global needs of businesses. The Cold War has been replaced
by the Economic War. The increase in trade secret theft has placed the
technologies of U.S. companies, ranging from simple textile formulas to
complex defense technology, at great risk.
Id. (notes omitted).
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13

B. Economic Espionage and the Internet

Increasingly, foreign entities need not even come to the
United States to acquire sensitive technology but,
instead, can work within their own borders. There, U.S.
firms have difficulty securing their secrets and have few
legal protections once proprietary information has been
14
lost.
Economic espionage is far from a new phenomenon. The
development of the U.S. textile industry in the early 1800s is a
direct result of Francis Cabot Lowell visiting England and
memorizing the workings of their power looms. Upon returning
to New England he recruited a master mechanic to recreate and
15
develop what he had memorized. The Chinese were able to
protect their proprietary interests in the silk trade for in excess
of two thousand years, further illustrating that economic
16
The secret was
espionage is not a recent phenomena.
ultimately lost, according to one account, when a Chinese
princess married a foreign prince and smuggled silkworm eggs
out of China by hiding them in her voluminous hair piece (circa
17
AD 440). A second account credits two Nestorian monks (circa
AD 550) with smuggling silkworm eggs in their hollow bamboo
18
staves for delivery to the Byzantine Emperor Justinian. The
point of these historical anecdotes is to demonstrate that human
behavioral characteristics have not changed over the ages. This
behavior continues to provide the incentive for reducing an
adversary’s competitive advantage by utilizing espionage
techniques to elicit proprietary secrets.
The challenge of protecting intellectual and proprietary
assets has been made more difficult by the arrival of the
information age and the Internet. Information has become a
marketable commodity with an inherent value and intrinsic self-

13. For more on this issue, see infra subpart III.B.2 (discussing real-world crime
and online crime).
14. See ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
15. See John J. Fialka, While America Sleeps, 21 WILSON Q. 48, 51 (1997).
16. See, e.g., History of Silk, http://silkroadfoundation.org/artl/silkhistory.shtml.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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worth. The fact that technological progress has evolved to the
point where information is stored on networks, many of which
are linked together by the Internet, has changed the framework
relating to information protection and the legal boundaries that
traditionally served to constrain the dissemination of sensitive
data to nonauthorized users.
Prior to the era of digital connectivity, intellectual property
and trade secrets were targeted by foreign intelligence services,
competitors and criminals, using collection methods consisting
of classic agent recruitments, volunteers, surveillance,
19
surreptitious entry, and specialized technical operations. All of
these techniques were characterized by boundaries imposed by
conventional three-dimensional limits relating to proximity,
20
scale, physical constraints, and patterns. The Internet and its
employment of a new medium, cyberspace, dramatically
changed the nature of information collection whether the
collector is a foreign intelligence service, competitor or
21
criminal. Cyberspace does not restrict a collector to traditional
techniques. It expands collection methods and operations by
leveraging existing tradecraft with a dramatic reduction in risk
22
and a corresponding logarithmic increase in potential reward.
Collectors employing Internet collection techniques are not
bound by the need to have proximate access to targeted
information or agents. The process of spotting, assessing,
recruiting, evaluating, and deploying potential agents no longer
requires that a case officer make direct contact to accomplish
tasks relating to logistics, communications, and security. These

19. See ONCIX REPORT 2004, supra note10. at 3.
20. Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model of
Law Enforcement?, 30 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1–9 (2004) [hereinafter Brenner,
A New Model of Law Enforcement].
21. Id.
22. One source notes, for example, that “[m]any spy agencies around the world are
adapting classic spy techniques from military and political espionage endeavors to
conduct economic espionage.” Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions
Redefined, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 303 (1997). According to this author, these “[a]gencies
use a number of ‘intrusive’ methods to obtain classified proprietary economic information
relating to trade secrets,” which include “[e]avesdropping through wiretapping, bugging
offices, or capturing cellular telephone conversations” and “[p]enetrating a computer
system through hacking into the network, hard drive, or software.” Id.
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basic house-cleaning functions frequently permitted counterintelligence agents to detect, deter, and disrupt an adversary’s
operations. Their absence necessitates a major shift in
counterintelligence operations to counter the absence of
traditional indicators of collection activity.
Prior to the employment of digital memory devices and
network connectivity, intelligence operatives were limited with
respect to the scale of their operations and individual case
officer and agent supervisory spans of control. “Cyber case
officers” using virtual agents do not have the scale of their
operations limited to a finite number of “cyber agents” but,
instead, can deploy virtual cyber resources in unlimited
quantities simultaneously. These cyber agents can respond to
multiple collection requirements, remotely targeting multiple
objectives simultaneously with limited risk. The reduction in
risk is due to the absence of physical constraints present in
traditional intelligence operations.
Perhaps the greatest advantage to the collector is the ability
to utilize the absence of proximity, scale, and lack of physical
constraints together with deception schemes intended to conceal
the identity and location of the actual adversary. The novelty of
digital intelligence-gathering and concomitant absence of
patterns is a primary factor in the reduction of risk, making
these methods so attractive. A victimized government,
corporation, or individual today will have an exceptionally
challenging task merely identifying the cyber collector who has
targeted their information. This is, of course, assuming the
victim is even aware of the fact that he or she has been subject
to an attack!
Additional factors driving intelligence operatives to fully
engage in virtual collection methods and operations is the welldocumented reluctance of victims to report digital penetration
and the fact that several studies reflect exceptionally low
awareness of victims recognizing that they have been subjected
to attacks.
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C. Economic Espionage: The Usual Suspects?
[T]he Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . has reported that
at least twenty-three foreign governments actively target the
intellectual property of U.S. corporations. One FBI study also
found that of 173 countries, 100 were spending resources to
23
acquire U.S. technology.
Reports published by the Central Intelligence Agency and
Government Accounting Office have publicly identified foreign
countries engaging in state-sponsored collection activities
targeting intellectual property and trade secrets belonging to
24
the United States. Recognizing the severity of foreign collection
operations targeting U.S. technology, Congress has required an
annual report which will keep it informed of the threat
25
parameters. This report, which is entitled “Annual Report to
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage,” is published annually in a classified and
26
unclassified version. The 2003 unclassified version notes that
“[f]oreign businessmen, scientists, academics, and government
officials from more than 90 countries continued targeting
sensitive U.S. technologies and corporate trade secrets in both
2002 and 2003, according to a variety of reporting available to

23. Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock
Market Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW
25, 27 (2001–2002).
The following countries are allegedly extensively engaged in espionage
activities against American companies: France, Israel, Russia, China, Iran,
Cuba, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Canada, India, and
several Scandinavian countries. The most frequently targeted industries
appear to include aerospace, biotechnology, computer software and
hardware, transportation and engine technology, defense technology,
telecommunications, energy research, advanced materials and codings,
‘stealth’ technologies, lasers, manufacturing processes, and semi-conductors.
Id.
24. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL
ESPIONAGE—2003 iii (2004), http://www.nacic.gov/publications/reports_speeches/ reports/
fecie_all/fecie_2003/fecie_2003.pdf [hereinafter ONCIX 2003 REPORT].
25. See id.
26. Id.
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the U.S. Counterintelligence (CI) Community.” A primary
distinction between the two versions of the report relates to the
identification of specific foreign countries engaging in various
collection activities. However, despite the omission of specific
country identities in the open version of the Annual Report,
cursory research of open sources permits an analyst to make
judgments likely reflecting those nations most actively engaged
in these operations.
A 1996 article in the Washington Post referred to a CIA
public report identifying the governments of France, Israel,
China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba as being extensively involved in
economic espionage. According to the article, “[a]s for Japan,
which is often accused of high-tech thievery, the CIA said that
nation’s efforts to collect economic data ‘are mostly legal and
involve seeking openly available material or hiring well-placed
28
consultants.’” The information reported in the article was
released by the CIA as part of a declassified hearing volume on
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United
29
States.”
In addition to the countries acknowledged in the CIA report,
recently published news accounts and other documents have
included South Korea and Germany as active participants in
30
efforts aimed at collecting U.S. sensitive information. It should
be stated that historically the U.S. government has been
reluctant to publicly identify foreign governments considered to
be its traditional allies as engaging in economic espionage. This
reluctance reflects the diplomatic reality that relations between
governments occur on many levels simultaneously. Therefore,
publicly acknowledging that an ally is aggressively attempting
to collect sensitive government information may serve to
needlessly escalate diplomatic tensions. Normally, these
concerns are addressed via back channels with private warnings

27. Id. at v.
28. Paul Blustein, France, Israel Alleged to Spy on U.S. Firms, WASH. POST,
Aug. 16, 1996, at A28.
29. S. Rep. No. 105-1, at 12 (1997).
30. See, e.g., INTERAGENCY OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF, OPERATIONS SECURITY:
INTELLIGENCE THREAT HANDBOOK § 5 (1996), http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/ioss/threat96/
part05.htm [hereinafter OPERATIONS SECURITY].
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and subtle signals indicating that continued behavior deemed
unacceptable may rise to a level outside of normal diplomatic
channels, and if the behavior continues, it may be accompanied
by embarrassing political consequences. Additionally, it is
generally acknowledged that all countries engage in various
aspects of espionage to one degree or another. The inclination to
promulgate a “holier than thou” attitude with respect to
espionage has the potential to be perceived as highly
hypocritical in the event of a retaliatory response.
The advent of the information age and corresponding global
connectivity has increased the vulnerabilities of U.S. intellectual
assets. The 2003 Annual Report to Congress reports that
multiple sources of evidence suggest that foreign interests are
increasingly looking to cyber tools as a means of enhancing their
31
ability to illegally acquire sensitive information.
Digital
incursions are difficult to detect, and there is a lack of factual
data conclusively establishing the dollar value of assets lost
annually by these methods. However, estimates by the
American Society of Industrial Security, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, derived from a 2002
survey of Fortune 1000 corporations and 600 small to mid-sized
U.S. companies, state that proprietary information and
intellectual property losses accounted for between fifty-three
32
and fifty-nine billion dollars. There is a consensus that the

31. See ONCIX 2003 REPORT, supra note 24, at v. The 2004 Annual Report to
Congress specifically notes that:
[g]lobal connectivity via the Internet adds to U.S. vulnerability. A variety of
evidence suggests that foreign interests continue looking to cyber tools as a
means to illegally acquire trade secrets. The number of information security
incidents reported to the U.S. Computer Security Readiness Team is an
indicator of the rapid rate at which cyber activity has grown in recent years.
The number of such incidents rose from about 500,000 events in 2002 to 1.4
million in 2003 and then to 56 million events in the first six months of 2004,
according to press reports.
Detection of such intrusions is difficult but, even when detected, a recent
private U.S. survey indicated that more than half of the impacted firms do
not report the breach for fear of reducing shareholder value. As a result, no
one is certain how much technology and sensitive proprietary information
are lost annually to cyber theft.
See ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
32. ASIS Int’l, U.S. Companies Lost up to $59 Billion in Proprietary Information

BRENNER FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS

2006]

STATE-SPONSORED CRIME

3/21/2006 11:29 AM

401

Internet has provided traditional and nontraditional adversaries
with a low-risk, inexpensive collection mechanism capable of
33
targeting and circumventing security countermeasures.
Anecdotal country information obtained exclusively from open
sources is presented to illustrate the international variety of
threats and cyber tactics employed by various foreign
governments.
1.

34

France

The French view of economic competition is characterized by
the belief that a state of continuous competition exists among
nations where market advantages are pursued by all available
35
means. This helps to explain the lengthy history of French
government intelligence agencies targeting U.S. economic and
proprietary data. The French General Directorate of External
Security (DGSE) has been reported as targeting economic
36
intelligence since at least 1964. Corporations reported to be
targeted by the DGSE in the past have included Loral Space
Systems and Hughes Aircraft, the former Lockheed Missile and
37
Information targeted
Space Company, TRW, and GTE.
38
included satellite and telecommunications data.
Former director of French Intelligence Pierre Marion is
frequently quoted as stating, “getting intelligence in economic,
technological, and industrial matters [from] a country [with]
which you are allied . . . is not incompatible with the fact of
39
being allied.” A unique aspect of French economic espionage
collection efforts, detailed by Peter Scwweizer in his book
and Intellectual Property, http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/pressReleases1093002
trends.xml (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
33. ONCIX 2003 REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.
34. For more on France’s economic espionage activities, see, e.g., JOHN J. FIALKA,
WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 87–100 (1997).
35. See, e.g., JOHN A. NOLAN III, A CASE STUDY IN FRENCH ESPIONAGE:
RENAISSANCE SOFTWARE, U.S. OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 (2000),
http://www.hanford.gov/oci/maindocs/ci_r_docs/frenchesp.pdf.
36. See, e.g., OPERATIONS SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. PETER SCHWEITZER, FRIENDLY SPIES: HOW AMERICA’S ALLIES ARE USING
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE TO STEAL OUR SECRETS 99 (1993) (alteration in original).
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Friendly Spies, involves the use of “honorary correspondents” or
40
part-time agents. This network of part timers is comprised of
corporate officials living overseas, French bankers in New York
41
City and bureaucrats at the European Community in Brussels.
Employees of nationalized French companies are particularly
42
prone to act as part time collectors.
In 1996, the French established the Ecole de Guerre
43
Econimique (School of Economic Warfare). It was established
by the Defense Consultancy International, a semi-public
44
company linked to the French Defense Ministry. “French
academics, journalists, retired military and intelligence officials
45
work for the school.” The school’s director Christian Harbulot is
quoted as stating:
[T]he U.S. is the top priority. There is true industrial
competition and there are many fields where we have
everything to lose. We cannot let ourselves be pushed around. A
huge number of companies have disappeared because they were
bought out or destroyed by the Americans. We have to protect
46
ourselves.
It is evident that the French view the cyber arena as a
significant resource in satisfying their collection requirements.
It has been reported as early as 1987 that French intelligence
co-opted a French hacker by threatening prosecution unless he
cooperated with their request that he infiltrate the French
hacking community. French intelligence desired information
47
relating to the latest hacking techniques and tools. It is highly
unlikely that the interest exhibited by French Intelligence has
declined in the intervening years subsequent to this event, and
40. Id. at 100.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 100–01.
43. See Kelly Uphoff, Tilting the Playing Field: Economic Espionage Hasn’t Gone
Away Since 9/11, JEWISH INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. AFF. (2005), http://www.jinsa.org/
articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/2518/documentid/2835/history/3,2360,656,
1082,2518,2835.
44. Id.
45. French Economic Spies Target U.S., WORLD NET DAILY, Dec. 11, 2004,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41873.
46. Id.
47. See JAMES ADAMS, THE NEXT WORLD WAR 160 (Simon & Schuster 1998).
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with the explosion of spyware and other virtual resources, the
capabilities of the French intelligence service are presumed to
have increased in sophistication and effectiveness.
2.

Russia

During the Cold War, Russian efforts to collect sensitive
military information were considered the primary intelligence
threat targeting the United States. A recent article in the
November 15, 2004 issue of U.S. News & World Report has a
report stating intelligence insiders furnished information
revealing that Vladimir Putin had recently increased Russian
resources targeting the United States to levels reaching the high
48
water mark of the Cold War. However, current collection
efforts are aimed at trade and manufacturing secrets of major
U.S. corporations, like IBM and ExxonMobil, with the intent of
obtaining information relating to contracts that corporate
America is pursuing. The United States’ involvement in the War
on Terror is perceived as a major distraction facilitating these
49
collection efforts.
This information makes incidents like the one occurring in
October 2000, where Microsoft staff noticed a problem with new
accounts being created that did not match their audit logs,
50
potentially more significant. In researching the anomaly, it
was discovered that an employee received an e-mail carrying a
51
worm and inadvertently installed it. The worm, subsequently
identified as the QAZ worm, functioned as a backdoor tool giving
52
remote users control of an infected PC. After gaining entry to
the infected computer, the worm disguised itself as a

48. Paul Bedard et al., The Reds Are Dead, But the Spies Are Still Around, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 15, 2004, at 10. Russia is also targeting other countries.
See, e.g., German Intelligence Worried About Increasing Russian Espionage, GLOBAL
NEWS WIRE, Feb. 3, 2005.
49. Bedard, supra note 48, at 10.
50. John Schwartz, Irregular New Accounts Alerted Microsoft to Network Intruder,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, § 1, at 28.
51. Liam Lahey, Microsoft Gets Hacked, ITWORLDCANADA, Oct. 17, 2000,
http://www.itworldcanada.com//Pages/Docbase/ViewArticle.aspx?D=idgml-e164b03b6041-4229-b34a-899cd0d968d2.
52. Id.
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NOTEPAD.EXE file and could be spread through the network as
53
a shared resource. The worm then sent a remote signal to a
computer in Asia identifying the location of the newly infected
54
computer and also, according to some analysts, automatically
downloaded and installed various hacking tools from another
55
remote site. The intruder then used a program to collect
passwords and automatically sent them to an e-mail address in
56
Russia. Using the collected passwords, the intruder posed as a
Microsoft employee working at a remote location and accessed
57
sensitive proprietary information. It cannot be conclusively
established if this action was state-sponsored; however, this
does not lessen the significance of this espionage activity since
the loss of sensitive information was the ultimate result.
An incident like this, referred to as worm-based espionage,
establishes that it is not necessary for a collector to “hack” a
computer directly, but rather, it may employ virtual agents
(worms) to perform the penetration and report back to the case
officer. The utilization of virtual agents poses significant
challenges to those responsible for security countermeasures
and complicates the legal remedies traditionally intended to
serve as deterrents. Virtual agents are not constrained by
international borders. Consequently, when remotely deployed,
their detection and subsequent investigation may involve multinational investigative coordination, jurisdictional disputes, and
legislative disparity with respect to whether a criminal act has
been committed.

53. Id.
54. Charles R. Fagg, QAZ, SANS Inst., Aug. 6, 3002, at 3, http://www.sans.org/rr/
whitepapers/malicious/47.php.
55. Ted Bridis & Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Hacked! Code Stolen?, ZDNET,
OCT. 26, 2000, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-525083.html.
56. Id.
57. George A. Chidi, Jr. & Laurea Rohde, Microsoft’s Network Suffers Hack Attack,
NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 27, 2000, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2000/1027
bighack.html.
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Japan

Japan’s economic espionage and intelligence collection
activities directed against the United States are unique in
several respects. The Japanese government has a limited formal
intelligence organization; however, its major corporations, in
conjunction with the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI), have active corporate intelligence
58
organizations that collect economic and political information.
Japan has used human sources within U.S. corporations, bribed
corporate employees to purchase proprietary data, and used
Japanese graduate students and researchers to collect sensitive
59
information from universities and research institutes.
An example of Japanese researchers involved in espionage
activities occurred in May 2001, when Japanese researchers
Hiroaki Serizawa and Takashi Okamoto were indicted on
charges of stealing genetic materials pertaining to Alzheimer’s
disease from the Cleveland Clinic Foundation in May 1999. A
plea bargain resulted in a reduction of charges against Serizawa
from industrial espionage to one count of perjury. Okamoto
resigned from the clinic in July 1999 and returned to Japan. The

58. See, e.g., Christopher G. Blood, Comment, Holding Foreign Nations Civilly
Accountable for Their Economic Espionage Practices, 42 IDEA 227, 230 (2002).
Japanese agents, operating out of the Japanese consulate in San Francisco,
worked with a researcher at Fairchild Semiconductors in Silicon Valley to
steal corporate plans and secrets on computer developments. As much as
160,000 pages of confidential information may have been passed through
consular officials to Japanese corporations that were in competition with
Fairchild. Indirect support for such activities by foreign governments is not
uncommon. As early as 1972, the Japanese Parliament established the
Economics Industry Deliberation Council to direct intelligence gathering.
Oversight of this council was by the Ministry for Trade and Industry, which
decades earlier had been the conduit for the Japanese government to
subsidize worldwide travel by thousands of Japanese businessmen for the
purpose of gathering information on foreign technological advances. By the
late 1980s, a CIA classified report indicated that more than three-fourths of
Japan’s intelligence resources were aimed at acquiring secrets and
information on technological advances from the United States and Western
Europe.
Id.
59. OPERATIONS SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5.
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United States claimed Okamoto acted with the intent of
profiting by delivering the materials to Japan’s Institute of
Physical and Chemical Research, popularly known as RIKEN.
60
RIKEN employed Okamoto after he returned to Japan.
In another incident, a Japanese television network (NHK)
played a prominent role in aiding Japanese corporate and
governmental interests in penetrating the trade secrets of
61
Using the pretense of a
American biotechnology firms.
documentary film to gain access to several biotechnology firms,
NHK personnel, attempted to film proprietary information
62
processes and documents. Detailed interview data was solicited
from scientists relating to their research activities and combined
with film footage permitting NHK to obtain significant insights
into the technologies, R&D activities and strategic capabilities of
63
these firms.
Estimates that eighty-five to ninety percent of intelligence
collected by Japanese government and industry sources is
economic information largely based on proprietary data have
64
been reported by publications such as “The OPSEC Journal.” A
1987 CIA report identified two top Japanese intelligence
priorities as 1) intelligence relating to access to foreign sources
of raw materials and 2) detailed information on technological
and scientific developments in the United States and Western
65
Europe. “The report states that nearly eighty percent of all
Japanese intelligence assets are focused on gathering technical
66
and economic information from the United States and Europe.”
Currently, a debate is occurring in Japan with respect to
the legality of deploying cyber weapons. The Japanese
60. Tetsuya Morimoto, First Japanese Denial of U.S. Extradition Request:
Economic Espionage Case, 20 No. 7 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 288 (2004).
61. See William M. Fitzpatrick, Uncovering Trade Secrets: The Legal and Ethical
Conundrum of Creative Competitive Intelligence, 68 SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J., 4, 7
(2003).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. OPERATION SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5.
65. Jeff Augustini, From Goldfinger to Butterfinger: The Legal and Policy Issues
Surrounding Proposals to Use the CIA for Economic Espionage, 26 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS.
459, 478 (1995).
66. Id. (discussing the Congressional Cox Committee Report).
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Constitution prohibits its military from engaging in offensive
operations. Determining whether the deployment of computer
viruses and hacking techniques is considered an offensive
military tactic requires clarification. However, there is no
prohibition against using cyber tactics to elicit sensitive
information. Published reports reflect that the Japanese Self
Defense Forces have budgeted for the establishment of a
cyberforce. It would be highly unusual if capabilities developed
for this cyberforce are not deployed. It is conceivable that virtual
assets developed for the self-defense forces could be provided to
private sector intelligence gathering organizations for
operational use.
4.

China

In 1999, the Congressional Cox Committee Report on the
People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) espionage activities directed
67
at the United States was released. This document provided a
comprehensive examination of Chinese espionage targeting
various U.S. industries for the express purpose of accelerating
the acquisition and development of dual-use science and
technology intended to enhance Chinese economic performance.
The Cox Report’s findings include a determination that in 1986
a major initiative identified as the 863 Program was approved
by the Chinese leadership to advance the Chinese economy.
According to the Report, this program produced nearly 1,500
research achievements by 1996. Approximately 30,000 scientific
68
and support personnel were actively engaged on this project.
Numerous accounts of Chinese economic espionage
activities have been reported by the press supporting the
findings of the Cox Report. In its March 22, 1999 issue,
Newsweek magazine outlined a shopping list of PRC technology
requirements that included those listed below. A comparison of
this list and the types of technology reported in legal

67. Id.
68. Scott L. Wheeler, How Beijing Gets U.S. Defense Plants, INSIGHT ON THE
NEWS, Mar. 6, 2003, http://www.insightmag.com/media/paper441/news/2003/03/18/
World/How-Beijing.Gets.U.Defense.Plants-384405.shtml.
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proceedings as being sought by agents of the PRC tends to
69
validate the Newsweek information.
Newsweek List
Avionics: Aircraft engines, air frames, gyroscopes and
simulation equipment and software . . .
Materials: High-strength polymers and strong plastics used
in . . . stealth technology . . .
Supercomputers: Aerospace . . . guidance systems, launchers,
telemetry technology and . . . communications gear
Biotechnology: Manipulation of living cells to create new
drugs . . .
Medical technology: . . . [P]harmaceuticals and . . . advanced
70
equipment for testing and treatment.
Economic Espionage Incidents
Three Chinese immigrants, two of whom were employees of
Lucent Technologies, were arrested for attempting to take the
source code for the PathStar Server, build a company around it,
and market it in China to a conglomerate officially owned by the
Chinese government. The subsequent FBI investigation revealed
e-mails allegedly showing the partners listing intellectual assets
identical to those of PathStar. Unfortunately for Lucent, the
investigation further revealed that the source code had been
conveyed to the Chinese corporation and is unlikely to be
71
recoverable.
In December 2003, a Silicon Valley grand jury indicted Fei
Ye and Ming Zhong for allegedly conspiring to steal computerchip trade secrets from Sun Microsystems, NEC Electronics,
Trident Microsystems, and Transmeta. The two were allegedly
involved in a plot to hatch a research project called Supervision,
which was funded by the Chinese government to finance a high-

69. See Daniel Klaidman et al., Open Secret, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1999, at 28.
70. Id.
71. Massimo Calabresi, The Company of Spies, TIME, May 14, 2001, at 51.
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tech company that would compete with U.S. chipmakers.
In a second Silicon Valley case, Qing Jiang was arrested in
Cupertino, California on charges that he illegally exported
microwave amplifiers to China. These items are dual-use
73
products that can be used for civilian and military applications.
“According to the affidavit, the components were being sent to a
company with the same address as [the Chinese] Ministry of
Communication[s], Telemetry and Telecontrol, also known as
the 54th Research Institute, which develops missile-guidance
74
systems.”
The close correlation between the Newsweek “shopping list”
and the items targeted by Chinese representatives described in
the legal sampling provided is indicative of an organized
collection effort targeting sensitive U.S. information. It can be
surmised that for every successful legal intervention relating to
these collection efforts, an undetermined number of covert
operations never detected by U.S. law enforcement agencies are
likely to have occurred.
5.

Germany

German targeting efforts aimed at sensitive or proprietary
information have not received the degree of public reporting that
characterizes those countries publicly identified in the 1996 CIA
public report. However, despite not being publicly identified by
the CIA, several writers have accused Germany of using
computer-intrusion techniques to gather information on foreign
competitors with the intention of passing this information to
75
German corporations. These reports further allege that “[t]he
German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) [has] created a
classified, computer intelligence facility outside [of] Frankfurt

72. Edward Iwata, More U.S. Trade Secrets Walk Out Door with Foreign Spies,
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-02-12-espionage_x.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2006).
73. Laurie J. Flynn, Chinese Businessman acquitted of Illegal High-Technology
Exports, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2005, at C15.
74. Edward Iwata, More U.S. Trade Secrets Walk Out Door with Foreign Spies,
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-02-12-espionage_x.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2006).
75. OPERATIONS SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5.
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designed to permit intelligence officers to enter . . . networks
76
and databases from countries around the world.” This program
is alleged to have been code named RAHAB and to have
accessed computer networks in the United States as well as
77
other countries.
Anecdotal evidence supporting German collection activity
became public in 1991 when IBM accused the German
intelligence service of eavesdropping on its telecommunications
and passing this information to German competitors. IBM lost
several significant business opportunities at this time and
speculated that these losses were likely due to inside
78
information obtained by German competitors in this fashion.
Other reports point to 1970 as the year the BND was given a
79
mandate to collect more information within the United States.
The breakup of the former Soviet Union has permitted the BND
to focus its efforts on economic intelligence, and consequently,
the United States has become its primary economic intelligence
80
target.
6.

Israel

Israel is unique in that it has a special relationship with the
United States extending to its inception. However, there has
never been any doubt that Israeli interests are not subjugated
by this relationship to the extent that its perceived national
security interests are compromised. Israel views itself as being
in a permanent state of war and, consequently, deploys its
intelligence services in a very aggressive manner. A former
intelligence official was quoted in the September 3, 2004 issue of
the Los Angeles Times, stating, “There is a huge, aggressive,
ongoing set of Israeli activities directed against the United
States. Anybody who worked in counterintelligence in a
professional capacity will tell you the Israelis are among the
most aggressive and active countries targeting the United
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Peter Schweizer, Op-Ed., Our Thieving Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 23, 1992, at
A21.
79. Augustini, supra note 65, at 481.
80. See id.
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81

States.” Several anecdotal incidents are presented to illustrate
the aggressive nature of Israel’s intelligence services.
An article appearing in the Washington Times on December
16, 2004 is the most recent charge in a long running history of
published reports alleging Israeli espionage activities directed at
the United States. The article reports that Israeli defense
officials in the United States have been accused by the FBI of
industrial espionage. The Israeli Defense Ministry denied that
its representatives have been accused of industrial espionage
but acknowledged that the U.S. government has complained
about overly insistent information-gathering by Israelis at
82
military equipment exhibitions. A Defense Ministry spokesman
maintained that no accusations were made, but rather asserted
concern about the aggressive collection of information that was
83
The Israeli spokesman, however, did
not classified.
acknowledge that some of the information is still protected by
U.S. officials, and this served to create a grey area that became
84
the source of friction.
The Wall Street Journal reported in 1992 that Israeli agents
attempted to steal Recon Optical’s top secret airborne spy
85
camera. Recon Optical, an Illinois company, received a contract
from the Israeli Air Force to manufacture aerial reconnaissance
cameras. The terms of the contract permitted Israel to have
members of its Air Force on site at Recon’s manufacturing
facility. Israeli Air Force Officers were observed by company
security officials attempting to remove Recon Optical trade
secrets from the plant in violation of the contractual
86
agreement.
In a third instance receiving minimal publicity, foreign
reporting sources Jane’s Information Group and Le Monde both

81. Bob Drogin & Greg Miller, Israel Has Long Spied on U.S., Say Officials, L.A.
TIMES, Sep. 3, 2004, at A1.
82. Joshua Mitnick, U.S. Accuses Officials of Spying, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004,
at A17.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Israeli Spying: The Mother of All Scandals, http://www.whatreally
happened.com/motherofallscandals (last visited Nov. 4, 2005).
86. See Blood, supra note 58, at 230.
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commented on the absence of U.S. news organizations to follow
87
up on a story reported by Fox News. This story reported that
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and other members of
the U.S. intelligence community were concerned about the
dominance of highly sensitive areas of U.S. telecommunications
by Israeli companies Verint (formerly Comverse Infosys) and
88
Amdocs. These firms provided U.S. law enforcement agencies
with wiretapping equipment and software record-keeping data
of virtually all calls placed by the twenty-five largest U.S.
89
telephone companies. Speculation that the hardware and
software permitted “catch gates,” which comprise the content of
90
wiretaps, was responsible for the concern of U.S. officials.
DEA’s alleged intense interest was prompted by its 1997
purchase of twenty-five million dollars in interception
91
equipment from Israeli companies.
7.

South Korea

The Defense Intelligence Agency has reported that South
Korean economic espionage activities directed against the
United States “have included stealing information from
computerized databases maintained by U.S. government
92
agencies and U.S. companies.” South Korea is alleged to
aggressively pursue its economic espionage activities by
accessing closed source environments utilizing electronic access,
physical access and access to personnel to obtain proprietary
93
information.
South Korean intelligence officers are purported to be
“extremely active in collecting political, economic, and

87. John F. Sugg, Israeli Spies Exposed, ALTERNET, Apr. 22, 2002,
http://www.alternet.org/story/12928.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. For more on Israel’s economic espionage efforts, see, e.g., Ed Blanche, With
Friends Like These. . ., THE MIDDLE EAST, Jun. 30, 2002.
92. OPERATIONS SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5.
93. Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined, 57 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 303, 306 (1997).
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technological secrets.” The best-known public example of this
collection effort was the apprehension and conviction of U.S.
citizen and Navy employee Robert Kim. Court documents
indicated that Mr. Kim’s dealings with the “South Koreans
focused on his knowledge of a classified computerized command
95
system that linked ships to satellites.” The South Korean
National Planning Agency is technically proficient, well funded
and has a well-organized network of informers who are paid
large sums for their efforts in collecting proprietary
96
information.
In addition to assigning members of its
intelligence service to its overseas embassies under diplomatic
cover, South Korean intelligence agents are also given
nonofficial cover positions with South Korean industrial
97
conglomerates such as Hyundi, Samsung, and others.
D. Business/Competitive Espionage
Competitive espionage has two aspects: the legal and
ethical pursuit of information that is of value in the day-to-day
activities by businesses attempting to gain a competitive
advantage and the unethical or illegal pursuit of information
relating to a competitor’s products or information. In essence,
both types of activity are characterized by intelligence collection
methods and operations. It is the mechanics of these operations
that distinguishes their legality.
The majority of business entities today have some form of a
competitive
intelligence
organization.
Typically,
these
operations may be formally labeled as “competitive intelligence”
departments by large corporations, or their functions may be
accomplished more informally by marketing or other
departments within smaller organizations. Ultimately, their
location on an organizational chart is irrelevant. Their mission
is intended to enable decisionmakers to more effectively manage
information that will enhance the competitive position of the
94. Id.
95. David Johnston, Korean Spy Case Called More Serious than was Thought, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at A8.
96. Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined, 57 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 303 (1997).
97. Id.
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company. It is interesting to note that competitive intelligence is
a body of knowledge that has attained professional status, with
a governing body requiring its membership to adhere to strict
98
levels of professional ethics. The Society of Competitive
Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) is a global nonprofit
membership organization for individuals involved in creating
and managing business knowledge. Competitive intelligence, as
defined by SCIP, is the legal and ethical collection and analysis
of information regarding the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
99
intentions of business competitors.
Collecting information for capability and vulnerability
analysis can be accomplished ethically by utilizing data-mining
techniques, patent tracking, war game exercises, psychological
profiling of competitor decisionmakers, and attending industry
100
trade shows.
The process of remaining cognizant of a
competitor’s intentions coupled with the ability to recognize
unanticipated market developments can be facilitated by
101
effective use of the Internet and mass media. These methods,
when supplemented by recurring conversations with customers,
suppliers, partners, employees, industry experts, and other
knowledgeable parties, enable information gathering to be
102
accomplished successfully within ethical parameters.
Unfortunately, not all efforts to collect business information
are conducted in accordance with the SCIP guidelines for ethical
behavior. Ethics are compromised when traditional espionage
tradecraft is employed to gather data on targeted business
adversaries. Techniques utilized to induce a breach of confidence
on
behalf
of
a
targeted
individual
may
include
misrepresentation, bribery, fraud, improperly obtaining
financial data from third parties, illicit access, wiretapping, and
a variety of Internet collection tools. The cyber techniques that

98. See Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, http://www.scip.org/
2_faq.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
99. Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, http://www.scip.org/2_
overview.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
100. Stephen H. Miller, Competitive Intelligence—An Overview, COMPETITIVE
INTELLIGENCE, at 3–4, http://www.scip.org/Library/overview.pdf.
101. Id at 4.
102. Id.
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can be deployed present a significantly greater risk due to the
pervasive growth of networks used by businesses to store and
manage sensitive information. In contrast, the collector of
sensitive information faces a reduced risk in information
gathering due to the fact that information can be gathered
remotely. Combining this reduced risk with the fact that many
cyber attacks are not detected and business are reluctant to
acknowledge successful attacks, the advantages of cyber
collection are easily recognizable. Social engineering practices
combined with tools such as key stroke loggers, viruses, worms,
and Trojans can all be deployed with great effect.
E. Scope of the Problem
A 2002 survey sponsored by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and
the American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS), titled
“Trends in Proprietary Information Loss,” is an attempt to
103
quantify the magnitude of the problem. Computer hackers and
foreign intelligence services were identified as significant risks.
The experience of ASIS council members suggests that these
groups represent the greatest threat to an organization’s
proprietary information, which reinforces the necessity of
examining new approaches in confronting the challenge of cyber
104
information collection operations.
Cyber tactics employed by adversaries are fundamentally
similar to traditional methods involving fraud, deception, covert
access, insider recruitment, vendor visits, and specialized
technical operations. However, each of these tactics has its
potential effectiveness magnified when current technology is
used to leverage its impact.
These tactics are illustrated by incidents like the one
reported in August 2002, when Niku Corporation discovered its
server logs contained information that an IP address belonging
to Business Engine, a competitor, had used Niku passwords to
105
access the company’s network more than 6,000 times.
In

103. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & ASIS FOUND.,
SURVEY REPORT, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 26 (2002).
104. Id.
105. Joel McNamara, Secrets of Computer Espionage: Tactics and
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excess of 1,000 documents were downloaded during the
intrusions. Compromised information contained data about
upcoming features, lists of potential customers, and pricing and
106
The ensuing FBI investigation revealed that since
sales.
October 2001, outsiders had logged onto the internal Niku
network using fifteen different accounts and passwords to access
107
proprietary information.
The future is likely to be replete with similar cyber
collection techniques used to target sensitive information. It is
not difficult to anticipate that current Phishing schemes
intended to generate cash could easily be configured for
purposes of industrial espionage. Deceptive websites replicating
various divisions of a corporation would not be difficult to
construct. Information requested for ostensibly legitimate
purposes, if elicited, could be used to access other more sensitive
sites. This entire process could be accomplished remotely with
minimal risk even in the event the Phishing site was actually
discovered. The same counterfeit site could be used to download
Trojans containing spyware programs. An employee following
instructions believed to be disseminated by corporate authorities
could inadvertently download keystroke loggers, password
grabbers, or other malware, which would reveal passwords
providing access to sensitive files. The possibilities for using
known cyber techniques to accomplish espionage goals are
limited only by the imagination of the perpetrators.
Distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), viruses, and
bot networks could also be deployed in efforts to impede a
competitor’s efforts to compete or to extort cash. Law
enforcement agencies have begun to informally advise industry
counterparts, collaborating within Electronic Crime Task Forces
or the Infragard Membership Alliance, of an increase in the
108
number of cyber extortion incidents. One such case reported in
the Wall Street Journal involved an entrepreneur who allegedly
employed third parties to launch DDoS attacks against three

Countermeasures 5 (Wiley Publishing, Inc. 2003).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Brenner, A New Model of Law Enforcement, supra note 20, at 52–53.

BRENNER FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS

2006]

STATE-SPONSORED CRIME

3/21/2006 11:29 AM

417

109

competitors. Using bot-virus software, five to ten thousand
hijacked computers were directed to attack the designated
target competitors. According to the legal complaint, the three
targeted companies suffered damages estimated to exceed two
million dollars. Computer Economics Inc., a research firm in
Aliso Viejo, California, estimated that the cost of viruses in
terms of lost revenue and repair has increased from thirteen
billion dollars in 2003 to seventeen and one half billion dollars in
110
Despite the highly subjective nature of these cost
2004.
estimates, the fact that the trend reflects an ongoing increase is
not in dispute.
F. Criminal Espionage
Criminal activities intended to obtain intellectual property
or sensitive information are traditionally characterized by a
profit motive derived by exchanging information for cash or
receivables easily convertible to cash. These actions were
typically crimes of opportunity whereby disgruntled or former
employees availed themselves of insider access to procure
information of value and market it to interested third parties.
Frequently, the distinctions between purely criminal motives
and competitive espionage were blurred. This was due to the
marketability of the data obtained being limited primarily to
competitors or state-sponsored agents performing their duties in
an attempt to assist indigenous enterprises to compete in the
global marketplace.
Terrorists employing asymmetric tactics targeting critical
infrastructure sectors have added a new dimension to the scope
of the problem. Critical infrastructure sectors were recognized
as prime targets, and consequently, the intellectual property
and sensitive information maintained by these infrastructure
sectors have become legitimate terrorist objectives. The
vulnerability of these targets to cyber reconnaissance and attack
techniques challenges the effectiveness of law enforcement’s
traditional
investigative
practices.
Cyber
collection

109. Cassel Bryan-Low, Growing Number of Hackers Attack Web Sites for Cash,
WALL STREET J., Nov. 20, 2004, at A1.
110. Id.
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methodologies circumventing traditional security countermeasures and law enforcement practices have made gathering
sensitive data easier. Cybercrime’s lack of historic
characteristics crucial to today’s law enforcement model relating
to proximity, scale, physical constraints, and patterns requires
the application of innovative security countermeasures and law
enforcement strategies. The traditional “reactive” approach to
criminal/terrorist incidents will not be successful in achieving
the goal of mitigating detrimental impact to critical
infrastructure sector customers and the accompanying negative
economic consequences caused by service disruptions.
A collaborative approach to the protection of sensitive
critical infrastructure information will be required to counter
digital collection techniques. Law enforcement agencies lack the
expertise needed to independently address advancing software
developments in spyware, keystroke loggers, password crackers,
and the variety of malware being developed by criminal
elements. The fact that these criminal elements are emerging in
geographic locations ranging from Brazil to Eastern Europe and
the Former Soviet Union, and are capable of launching their
criminal operations remotely demonstrates the changing nature
of criminal espionage. A key characteristic of traditional crime—
proximity between victim and offender—is no longer a
requirement for the targeting of sensitive critical infrastructure
111
information. Spyware and keystroke loggers can be inserted
into networks by insiders or by Trojan software downloaded
surreptitiously and written for the express purpose of permitting
remote access to sensitive data present on information
112
networks.
DDoS attacks are becoming a preferred extortion method of
organized criminals taking advantage of the absence of scale
permitted by the wholesale harvesting of computers for attack
purposes. Anecdotal reporting from law enforcement officers
participating in Electronic Crime Task Forces indicates
organized crime gangs are contracting out cyber disruption
111. Brenner, A New Model of Law Enforcement, supra note 20, at 1–9.
112. See, e.g., Ravi Nessman, Israelis Nab 18 in Computer Espionage Case, A.P.,
May 29, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=802259&CMP=OTCRSSFeeds0312.
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services for purposes of extortion. These DDoS attacks are
accomplished by employing harvesting techniques that use a
variety of malware to gain control of thousands of computers for
subsequent attacks by bot networks. Intruders gain
unauthorized access to systems via backdoors inserted by massmailing worms. This access permits the intruder to execute
command-and-control software capable of directing these bot
networks as they execute DDoS attacks. The nature of this type
of criminal attack presents challenges to law enforcement
procedures steeped in a tradition of conditioned responses bound
by physical constraints. Similarly, the evolving nature of digital
networking has not matured sufficiently to permit the
recognition of patterns necessary for the application of an
effective law enforcement methodology.
III. THE LAW: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT (EEA)
The EEA is Congress’ attempt to deal with the problem
outlined in Part II, supra. Subpart III.A reviews the provisions
of the EEA—its definition of “trade secrets” and its imposition of
criminal liability on those who steal U.S. trade secrets. Subpart
III.B examines the systemic and contextual factors that erode
the EEA’s effectiveness as a tactic for dealing with such activity.
A. Provisions
Until 1996, there was no federal statute that specifically
criminalized economic espionage, that is, the theft of commercial
113
trade secrets. Federal prosecutors charged those who engaged
in such activity with various other crimes, including the
interstate transportation of stolen property or mail or wire
114
fraud. This approach, however, was ultimately unsatisfactory:
Because federal prosecutors sometimes had trouble “shoe-

113. See, e.g., COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL § VIII.A (2001),
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/08ipma.htm#VIII.A
[hereinafter
PROSECUTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL]. “Trade secrets” are defined in the text
above.
114. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) (governing interstate transportation
of stolen property); 18 U.S.C § 1341 (2000) (governing mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(2000) (governing wire fraud).
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horning” the theft of trade secrets into the above statutes and
because of the increased recognition of the increasingly
important role that intellectual property plays in the well-being
of the American economy, Congress enacted the Economic
115
Espionage Act of 1996, effective October 11, 1996.
Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839, the EEA criminalizes the
116
theft of U.S. trade secrets. As Part I noted, the EEA takes a
traditional approach to economic espionage by treating the
misappropriation of proprietary economic information as theft
117
and criminalizing it. The premise is that by prosecuting and

115. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.A.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12208 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of
Arlen Specter). Senator Specter stated:
[A] major problem for law enforcement in responding to the increase in such
thefts has been a glaring gap in Federal law. For many years, the United
States has had a variety of theft statutes in the United States Code. These
laws are derived primarily from the common law of theft. For example, it
violates Federal law to move stolen property across State lines. In order to
violate such laws, however, the courts have held that the property stolen
cannot be intangible property, such as trade secrets or intellectual property.
In addition, theft usually requires that the thief take the property with the
intention of depriving the lawful owner of its use. But such a test [is] useless
when a person copies software and leaves the original software with the
lawful owner, taking only the secrets on the software but leaving the
physical property. The lawful owner still has full use of the property, but its
value is significantly reduced.
In order to update Federal law to address the technological and economic
realities of the end of the 20th century, I began working earlier this year
with Senator [Kohl] and officials from the Department of Justice and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation on developing legislation. We developed two
separate bills, that were introduced as S. 1556 and S. 1557. The former bill
broadly prohibited the theft of proprietary economic information by any
person. The latter bill was more narrowly drawn to proscribe such thefts by
foreign nations and those working on behalf of foreign nations.
At the end of February, I chaired a joint hearing of the Intelligence
Committee and the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and
Government Information on the issue of economic espionage. Continuing to
work closely with members of the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, the
administration, and various industry groups, Senator [Kohl] and I were able
to produce the bill the Senate is today considering.
Id. at S12208.
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sanctioning those who unlawfully appropriate proprietary
information, we can deter others from engaging in such conduct.
1.

Trade Secret

The EEA contains an unusually broad definition of trade
118
secrets. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3), a trade secret “includes . . .
all types of information, however stored or maintained, which
the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep secret and
119
The EEA
which has independent economic value.”
encompasses intangible property, including “information stolen
in electronic form or merely memorized, [but] is not intended to
cover general knowledge or skills learned on a job when an
employee leaves one company and moves to another in the same
120
or similar field.”
Unlike patents, trade secrets need only be “minimally
121
novel.” This means “a trade secret must contain some element
that is not known and sets it apart from what is generally

118. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.2.C (noting that the EEA’s definition “is broader than other definitions of trade
secret,’ including notably the definition . . . in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act”); see, e.g.,
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 537–51 (Supp. 1986); see also RESTATMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (2005) (providing an alternate definition of trade
secret).
119. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.2.C; See also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000):
[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business,
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs,
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in
writing if
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, the public . . . .
120. Onimi Erekosima & Brian Koosed, Intellectual Property Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2004).
121. See, e.g., PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note
113, § VIII.B.2.C.
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122

known.” The key attribute of a trade secret under the EEA is
that it is information which “is not . . . generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, [sic]
123
It is not necessary that every aspect of the
the public.”
information be confidential; a trade secret can consist of a
“combination of elements that are in the public domain,” if the
trade secret itself constitutes “a unique, effective, successful and
124
valuable integration of the public domain elements.”
To qualify as a trade secret, information must also derive
independent economic value from not being generally known to
125
the public. The statute does not require that a trade secret be
valued at a specific jurisdictional amount for criminal liability to
126
be imposed upon those who misappropriate it. According to the
U.S. Department of Justice (Department of Justice),
the value of the trade secret need not be established
with precision and can be determined through a variety
of different methods, including: (1) the amount similar
trade secret information sold for on the legitimate open
market, if available; (2) a reasonable royalty calculation
based on what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller
for the technology in an arms-length transaction; (3) the
amount of research and development costs expended by
the trade secret owner; and, (4) as a last resort, the
thieves’ market price that the defendant actually
127
received or paid in exchange for the technology.
The final requirement for bringing information within the
EEA’s definition of a “trade secret” is that the owner(s) of the

122. Id. In the legislative history of the EEA, Congress noted that “[w]hile we do
not strictly impose a novelty or inventiveness requirement . . . for material to be
considered a trade secret, looking at the novelty or uniqueness of a piece of information
or knowledge should inform courts in determining whether something is a matter of
general knowledge, skill or experience.” 104 CONG. REC. S12201, S12212 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1996) (Managers’ statement for H.R. 3723, the Economic Espionage Bill).
123. Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes Manual, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.2.c.
124. Id. (quoting Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996)).
125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
126. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.2.C.
127. Id.
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information must have taken reasonable measures to keep the
128
In this respect, trade secret law differs
information secret.
fundamentally from the laws that protect other types of
property; theft and other statutes do not impose a similar
129
requirement. To come within the provisions of the EEA, the
owner of information must have utilized protective measures
that were reasonable under the circumstances; the nature and
130
extent of security employed is not an absolute. To impose
criminal liability for violating the EEA, “prosecutors must be
able to establish that the security measures used by the victim
to protect the trade secret were reasonably commensurate with
131
the value of the trade secret.”
According to the Department of Justice, the EEA ensures
that information does not lose its status as a trade secret as the
result of disclosures made to law enforcement agencies that are
132
investigating or prosecuting an EEA case. The Department of
Justice bases this conclusion on two provisions of the EEA.
First, section 1835 of title 18 of the U.S. Code authorizes courts
dealing with EEA prosecutions to “enter such orders and take
such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to
preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other
133
applicable laws.” Second, 18 U.S.C. § 1835(2) states that the
128. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
129. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.2.c (“[A] defendant can be convicted for stealing a bike even if the victim failed
to protect it by leaving it unlocked on his front porch.”).
130. See id.; see, e.g., Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 650 (5th Cir. 1997).
131. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.2.c. To that end, “prosecutors should determine the extent of the security used
to protect the trade secret, including physical security and computer security, as well as
the company’s policies on sharing information with third-parties.” Id.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (2000). As the Department of Justice notes, such disclosures
are essential if EEA cases are to be successfully prosecuted. Id.
133. Id. The Department of Justice continues:
This section is aimed at protecting the victim’s trade secret information
during . . . a criminal prosecution. Such protection would be unnecessary
unless it was contemplated that victims would first provide the government
with the trade secrets for use in the criminal investigation and prosecution.
In addition to the protection afforded . . . there are additional restrictions on
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EEA does not prohibit “the reporting of a suspected violation of
law to any governmental entity of the United States, a State, or
a political subdivision of a State, if such entity has lawful
134
authority with respect to that violation.” The Department of
Justice deduces, from the combined effect of these provisions,
that “it is unnecessary for federal prosecutors or law
enforcement agents to sign protective orders with victims before
135
accepting trade secret information.”
2.

Offenses

The EEA creates two different offenses: a § 1831 offense and
a § 1832 offense, each of which was intended to encompass a
specific type of activity. The EEA also imposes liability for
attempts and conspiracies, as explained below.
§ 1831 Offense
Section 1831 of title 18 of the U.S. Code criminalizes
“economic espionage,” which it defines as a theft of trade secrets
that benefits a foreign government, foreign instrumentality or
foreign agent. More precisely, § 1831 makes it a crime to steal,
copy, download, purchase, or possess a trade secret intending or
136
knowing that doing so will benefit a foreign agency. The EEA
the disclosure of trade secret information. . . . As a result, trade secret
owners who disclose information to law enforcement representatives should
not be deemed to have waived trade secret protection.
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.2.c.
For more on the use of protective orders, see id. § VIII.B.9.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(2)(2000).
The inclusion of this section, together with 18 U.S.C. § 1835, demonstrates
that Congress intended to ensure that someone who becomes aware of an
EEA violation has no disincentive to report criminal activity to law
enforcement. If disclosures to law enforcement, whether by the owner of a
trade secret or a third-party, eliminated trade secret protection,
Congressional intent would be frustrated.
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.2.c.
135. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.2.c.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000). Like its counterpart, the § 1832 offense, the
§ 1831 crime has three basic elements:
Under either section, to obtain conviction . . . the government must prove
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defines “foreign instrumentality” as “any agency, bureau,
ministry, component, institution, association, or any legal,
commercial, or business organization, corporation, firm, or
entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored,
commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign
137
It defines “foreign agent” as “any officer,
government.”
employee, proxy, servant, delegate, or representative of a foreign
138
government.”
In a § 1831 prosecution, the “government must show that
the defendant knew or had a firm belief that misappropriation
would benefit a foreign entity. When this entity ‘is not, per se, a
government entity (e.g., a business), there must be evidence of
foreign government sponsorship or coordinated intelligence
139
activity.’”
The requirement that the conduct has been
undertaken to benefit a foreign entity “is to be interpreted
broadly and is not limited to an economic benefit, but includes a
140
reputational, strategic, or tactical benefit.”
For “foreign instrumentalities” such as corporate and other
business entities, the EEA requires that the instrumentality
have been “substantially owned” or controlled by a foreign
141
government. While the EEA does not define “substantially,”
the Department of Justice takes the position that the use of this
term “suggests that the prosecution does not have to prove
complete
ownership,
control,
sponsorship,
command,
142
The EEA’s legislative history
management, or domination.”

beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant stole, or without
authorization of the owner, obtained, destroyed or conveyed information; (2)
the defendant knew or believed that this information was a trade secret; and
(3) the information was in fact a trade secret.
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.2. The
§ 1832 offense then adds an intentional element: intent to benefit a foreign government,
foreign instrumentality or foreign agent. See id.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1) (2000).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(2) (2000).
139. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.3 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996)).
140. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-788 (1996)).
141. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1).
142. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.3.
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states the following:
Substantial in this context, means material or
significant, not technical or tenuous. We do not mean
for the test of substantial control to be mechanistic or
mathematical. The simple fact that the majority of the
stock of a company is owned by a foreign government
will not suffice under this definition, nor for that matter
will the fact that a foreign government only owns 10
percent of a company exempt it from scrutiny. Rather
the pertinent inquiry is whether the activities of the
company are, from a practical and substantive
143
standpoint, foreign government directed.
Section 1831, therefore, does not apply when “a foreign
corporation misappropriates the trade secret and there is no
evidence of sponsorship or coordinated intelligence activity’ by a
144
foreign government.” Such a corporation could, however, be
prosecuted under § 1832.
§ 1832 Offense
The offense created by 18 U.S.C. § 1832 shares three
elements with the § 1831 offense: To obtain a conviction, the
government must prove that (i) the defendant stole, or without
authorization of the owner, obtained, destroyed, or conveyed
information which (ii) the defendant knew or believed was a
trade secret, and (iii) the information was in fact a trade
145
secret.
Unlike the § 1831 offense, the § 1832 crime does not require
the government to prove that the defendant acted with the
146
intent to benefit a foreign entity to secure a conviction. The
government must, however, prove two additional mens rea
143. Id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996)
(Manager’s statement for H.R. 3723, the Economic Espionage Bill).
144. Id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996)); see
David W. Simon, Prosecution of IP Theft Increases; Under the Economic Espionage Act
and Other Laws, the DOJ is Targeting Stolen Corporate Intellectual Property, NAT’L L.J.,
Aug. 11, 2003, at 15.
145. See supra note 136.
146. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.2.
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elements. First, it must prove that the defendant’s act of
misappropriating the trade secret “was intended for the
economic benefit of a person other than the rightful owner
(which can be the defendant, a competitor of the victim, or some
147
other person or entity).” The government must also prove that
the defendant intended to “injure” the owner of the trade
148
secret. “According to the legislative history of the EEA, this
provision does not require the government to prove malice or
evil intent, but merely that the actor knew or was aware to a
practical certainty that his conduct would cause some
149
disadvantage to the rightful owner.’” As the Department of
Justice explains, this requirement should not prove onerous for
prosecutors:
By definition, in order for a trade secret to have value,
it must confer a commercial advantage to the owner.
Once the information is disclosed to another for the
recipient’s benefit, the trade secret loses its value.
Accordingly, in many cases, establishing this element
may not require additional evidence beyond that
required to establish that the defendant acted for the
economic benefit of someone other than the owner. For
example, when a trusted employee of a computer chip
manufacturer steals a prototype chip and conveys it to a
known direct competitor of the owner, the disclosure of
the information to the competitor may be sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish the requisite
150
intent.
The government must also prove another non-mens rea
element to obtain a conviction under § 1832: that the trade
secret “is related to or included in a product that is produced for

147. Id. § VIII.B.4.a; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000). Consequently, “a person
who misappropriates a trade secret but who does not intend for anyone to gain
economically from the theft cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832.” PROSECUTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.4.a.
148. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.4.b.
149. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-788 (1996)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a).
150. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.4.b.
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151

or placed in interstate or foreign commerce.” This element
152
establishes federal jurisdiction. As the Department of Justice
explains, it is usually not difficult to establish the “commerce”
nexus:
[W]here the trade secret is related to a product actually
being manufactured and sold, this element would be
easily established by evidence of interstate sales. Where
a product is still in the development phase but is being
developed to be sold in interstate commerce, the
victim’s intent to distribute the product in the future
can be adequately demonstrated either by direct
witness testimony or by documentary evidence
153
describing the intended goals of the project.
Attempt and Conspiracy
Sections 1831 and 1832 each impose liability for attempting
and/or conspiring to commit the respective offenses they
154
155
define. In United States v. Hsu, the Third Circuit held that
the attempt offense created by § 1832(a)(4) requires that the
defendant have taken a “substantial step” toward the

151. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a); see PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES
MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.4.c (“This element encompasses two issues: that the
trade secret be related to a product, and that the product was produced for or placed in
interstate or foreign commerce.”).
152. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.4.c.
153. Id. Furthermore, it is not difficult to establish the “commerce” nexus for
products still in the research and development stage:
It is possible that a defendant might argue that products still in the research
and development stage are not yet being produced for interstate commerce’
because such items are not yet being produced’ for sale. This argument
should not be persuasive. If this argument were to prevail, much of the
protection of the EEA would be lost, since a trade secret is often most
valuable during the development phase. Once the product embodying the
trade secret is released to the public, the value of the trade secret is often
lost because the product can be examined and the trade secret obtained or
deduced.
Id.
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(4)-(5) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(4)-(5).
155. 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
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156

commission of the substantive offense. Both of the conspiracy
157
offenses specifically require the commission of an overt act.
The Hsu court also rejected defense arguments that one
charged with attempt or conspiracy to violate the EEA could
158
invoke the defense of legal impossibility. The defendants in
that case, who were charged with both conspiracy and attempt
under 18 U.S.C. § 1832, argued that they could not be held liable
if the information they allegedly misappropriated was not, in
159
fact, a trade secret. The Third Circuit disagreed, noting first
that under modern law, attempt liability is properly predicated
on the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. “The
government can satisfy its burden under § 1832(a)(4) by proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sought to acquire
information which he or she believed to be a trade secret,
regardless of whether the information actually qualified as
160
such.” The Third Circuit also held that legal impossibility is
not a defense to a charge of conspiracy under § 1832(a)(5)
because the gravamen of conspiracy is the illicit agreement to
commit a criminal act, not the actual commission of such an
161
Since the offense of conspiracy is predicated on the
act.
agreement, it is only necessary that the goals of the conspiracy,
that is, the theft of actual trade secrets, were objectively
162
unattainable. At least two other circuits have reached similar
163
conclusions.

156. See id. at 202. Since the statute is silent on the issue, the court construed it in
accordance with the Model Penal Code, which requires a substantial step for the
imposition of attempt liability. See id.
157. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(5), 1832(a)(5).
158. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 202–04.
159. See id. at 199.
160. Id. at 203.
161. See id. at 203–04.
162. See id. at 203.
163. See United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 268 (7th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 541–44 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Extra-territorial Jurisdiction
Section 1837 of the EEA confers extra-territorial jurisdiction
164
in EEA prosecutions. It is intended to rebut the presumption
165
against the extra-territorial applicability of U.S. laws and, in
that regard, departs from other intellectual property law.
Neither U.S. copyright nor patent law explicitly incorporates
166
extra-territorial jurisdiction.
Section 1837 states that the
provisions of the EEA apply:
to conduct occurring outside the United States if (1) the
offender is a natural person who is a citizen or . . .
resident alien of the United States, or an [entity]
organized under the laws of the United States or a
State or political subdivision thereof; or (2) an act in
furtherance of the offense was committed in the United
167
States.
B. Enforcement
“[R]isks remain small, while potential rewards
168
skyrocket.”
This subpart examines issues that undermine the EEA’s
effectiveness as a means of dealing with economic espionage.
Subpart III.B.1 describes how systemic factors—forces
influencing the criminal justice process in the United States—

164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2000).
165. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113,
§ VIII.B.10. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:
It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ . . . This ‘canon of
construction . . .’ serves to protect against unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) and citing
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22 (1963)).
166. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Trade Secrets—The New Risks to Trade
Secrets Posed by Computerization, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 234 (2002).
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837.
168. James Srodes, Washington Seeks Terrorists While Allies Steal Trade Secrets,
WORLD TRADE, Apr. 2002, at 12, available at 2002 WLNR 10520016.
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impede its enforcement. Subpart III.B.2 examines contextual
factors—the environment in which economic espionage occurs.
As noted earlier, the EEA approaches economic espionage as a
169
Therefore, it incorporates traditional
type of crime.
assumptions about crime in the physical world—assumptions
that do not hold when criminal activity moves online—into a
170
The influence of these assumptions
virtual environment.
therefore makes the EEA an increasingly problematic strategy
171
for dealing with online economic espionage.
1.

Systemic Factors

Initially, enforcement of the EEA proceeded cautiously. An
early version of the Act included the requirement that all
172
prosecutions be approved by the Attorney General. While this
provision was not included in the final version, then-Attorney
General Janet Reno sent the Senate a letter in which she
promised that the Department of Justice would not, “for a period
of five years after implementation of the Act,” file charges under
the EEA “without the personal approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant
173
Attorney General for the Criminal Division.” Reno’s letter also
pledged that this requirement would be “implemented by
174
published regulation,” and it was. Section 0.64-5 of title 28 of
the Code of Federal Regulation, which remained in effect until
October 11, 2001, incorporated the approval requirement and

169. See supra subpart III.A; see also infra subpart III.B.2.
170. See infra subpart III.B.2.
171. See infra subpart III.B.2.
172. One reason for adding the requirement was apparently a concern that the
statute would be misused to “interven[e] in commercial disputes best handled through
civil litigation.” Memorandum from U.S. Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft Renewing the
Approval Requirement for § 1831 Prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act of
1996 (Mar. 1, 2002), http://www.cybercrime.gov/eea1996.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft
Approval Requirement Memo]. Another concern was the potential international
consequences of filing a case under § 1831. See, e.g., John Mangels, Clinic Case is First
Use of New Law, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 30, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR
250929.
173. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12214 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1996) (letter from Attorney General Reno).
174. Id.
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declared that violations of the requirement “are appropriately
sanctionable and will be reported by the Attorney General to the
175
Senate and House Judiciary Committees.”
The
original
approval
requirement
implemented
176
encompassed prosecutions under both § 1831 and § 1832. That
requirement expired on October 11, 2001, but it was restored by
177
then-Attorney General Ashcroft. In March of 2002, Ashcroft
issued a memorandum in which he “revive[d] the prior approval
178
requirement for initiating prosecutions under § 1831 . . . .”
Under the revived policy, such prosecutions must be approved
by the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of
179
the Department of Justice. Ashcroft chose not to revive the
approval requirement for prosecutions under § 1832, but he
“strongly urge[d]” prosecutors to consult with the Department of
Justice’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
180
Since
“regarding § 1832 prosecutions prior to filing charges.”
Ashcroft’s memorandum did not set an expiration date for the
181
approval requirement, it remains in effect.
Since the Economic Espionage Act was first passed in 1996,
the Department of Justice has prosecuted forty-seven people in
182
thirty-four cases. The Department filed its first prosecution
under § 1831 in May of 2001, shortly before the original
183
approval requirement expired. After that requirement expired,
175. 28 C.F.R. § 0.64-5 (2000).
176. See id.; see also supra subpart III.A.2.
177. See Ashcroft Approval Requirement Memo, supra note 172.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 990.020(A), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/90mcrm.htm#
9-90.020.
182. Paul Elias, Espionage Act Proves Difficult to Prosecute, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE, Aug. 5, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WLNR 11191024. For a detailed
statistical review of the few prosecutions brought under the EEA, see Michael L. Rustad,
The Trouble with the Economic Espionage Act: Straining Out Gnats, Swallowing Camels,
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
183. See, e.g., Mangels, supra note 172; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment (May 8, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm.
Foreign
nationals are also prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832. See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d 189.
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184

the Department began bringing more cases, but the number of
EEA prosecutions is small compared to prosecutions for other
185
intellectual property violations.
There are several reasons for the relative paucity of EEA
prosecutions. One is that the statute was new in 1996, and it
took a while for prosecutors and investigators to learn how to
186
apply the new law.
That, of course, was a transient
phenomenon which cannot account for the relative scarcity of
prosecutions almost a decade after the EEA was enacted.
A factor of continuing importance is the complexity of the
cases. As one reporter noted, EEA cases are “thick with scientific
jargon and processes that take time for prosecutors . . . to sift
187
EEA cases tend to involve complex, novel
through.”
technologies that are case-specific. This, aside from anything
else, differentiates them from other intellectual property cases,
such as prosecutions for file sharing and copyright piracy.
Another factor is the Department of Justice’s desire only to
188
bring cases it can win. In renewing the approval requirement

184. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, Note, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial Application
of the Economic Espionage Act and the Trips Agreement, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1491
(2003). According to one source, the Department of Justice had brought a total of forty
EEA prosecutions by February 2003. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORTED CRIMINAL
ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS UNDER THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996,
http://my.execpc.com/~mhallign/indict.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006)([hereinafter
REPORTED CRIMINAL ARRESTS]. The Department of Justice’s website lists twenty-seven
prosecutions for the period 2000–2004. See COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP.
SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT (EEA) CASES,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eeapub.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
185. Compare REPORTED CRIMINAL ARRESTS, supra note 184, with U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES, http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipcases.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2006). Writing in 2001, a reporter noted that “[b]y 2000, the FBI had
more than 800 ongoing economic espionage investigations. But fewer than 25 of the
probes had resulted in criminal charges.” Mangels, supra note 172. As of 2002, ninetytwo EEA cases had been referred for prosecution. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT 2002, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3 (2004),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipt02.pdf [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
THEFT]. Compare this with the 210 referrals for copyright offenses and the 103 referrals
for trademark crimes during the same period. See id. Copyright and trademark cases
were more likely actually to be prosecuted. See id at 4.
186. See, e.g., Mangels, supra note 172.
187. Id.
188. See Ashcroft Approval Requirement Memo, supra note 172.
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for § 1831 prosecutions, Attorney General Ashcroft noted that an
“indication of the measured and thorough approach the
Department [of Justice] has taken with respect to investigating
and charging theft of trade secrets [was the fact that] there has
not been an acquittal under the EEA since passage of the
189
legislation.” That is no longer true; in 2002, for example, the
conviction rate in economic espionage prosecutions was seventy190
five percent.
A factor specific to § 1831 prosecutions, which accounts for
the fact that they are quite rare, is the diplomatic repercussions
191
of bringing forth such a claim. It is this concern that prompted
Attorney General Ashcroft’s retaining the approval requirement
for these prosecutions. As a reporter covering the first § 1831
prosecution noted, such a “case is potential diplomatic
192
dynamite” because it necessarily involves allegations that a
foreign government was involved in the misappropriation of
193
While § 1832 prosecutions target a type of
trade secrets.
traditional, individual crime, a § 1831 prosecution alleges the
194
commission of state-sponsored crime.
The implications of

189. Id.
190. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT, supra note 185, at 5. The conviction rate
for copyright cases was ninety-five percent, and eighty-five percent for trademark cases.
See id.
191. See, e.g., REPORTED CRIMINAL ARRESTS, supra note 184.
192. Mangels, supra note 172.
193. See supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing the §1831 offense).
194. The term “state-sponsored crime” denotes crimes the commission of which is
carried out by, or with the acquiescence of, a sovereign state. See, e.g., Barbara M.
Yarnold, Doctrinal Basis for the International Criminalization Process, 8 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 85, 109 (1994).
The first category of “state crimes” are crimes that involve state-sponsorship.
This type of crime cannot be perpetrated without such sponsorship. The
second category includes crimes that are conducted with state acquiescence.
In other words, the criminal condition can only exist due to the implicit
acceptance of the crime by the state in which it is perpetrated. The third
category of state crimes includes those crimes that are committed by public
officials on behalf of the state or with explicit state authorization. Finally,
the fourth category includes those crimes that can only be conducted by
states or that have only been conducted by states in the past.
Id. While the phrase “state-sponsored crime” usually refers to internal crime, i.e., crimes
a state commits against its own citizens, it can also refer to external crime, i.e., State A’s
involvement in crimes committed against citizens of State B. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana-

BRENNER FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS

2006]

STATE-SPONSORED CRIME

3/21/2006 11:29 AM

435

lodging such a claim have led the Department of Justice to be
195
particularly cautious in bringing cases for economic espionage.
A final, more general factor also contributes to the relative
paucity of EEA prosecutions: the “inherent tension between the
196
statute and defendants’ constitutional protections.” In one of
197
the first EEA prosecutions, the Department of Justice sought
a comprehensive protective order that would severely limit the
defense’s access to documents concerning the trade secrets
198
which the defendants allegedly sought to obtain. In support of
its motion, the government argued:
First . . . it has a legitimate interest in protecting the
integrity and confidentiality of trade secrets . . . .
Second, it contends that in the absence of in camera
review and redaction, the defendants will receive
information that is irrelevant and immaterial to their
defense . . . . Third, the Government raises the specter
of “graymail,” which occurs when defendants press for
the release of sensitive information and then threaten
publicly to disclose the information in an attempt to
199
force the Government to drop its charges . . . .

Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth and Justice for StateSponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1399, 1408 (2002). For more on this, see
infra Part IV.
195. See, e.g., Mangels, supra note 172.
196. United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1997), rev’d on other
grounds, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
197. The case was brought under § 1832 even though the defendants were foreign
nationals. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 193.
198. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1023.
199. Id. One of the reasons the Department of Justice raised the “graymail” issue
was its concern that a protective order might be of little use. See id. at 1026 (“The
Government can . . . be forgiven for not reposing much trust in defendants who it
contends are linked to wrongdoers far removed from the borders of our contempt
power.”). According to one source, the tactic could have worked: “After the district court
denied the government’s proposed protective order, Assistant United States Attorney
Richard Goldberg announced that if the court’s ruling were upheld, he would take
further steps to prevent the trade secrets from being revealed, possibly even dismissing
the case.” Susan V. Metcalfe, Comment, Protecting Trade Secrets: Is the Remedy Worse
than the Wrong?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 503, 518 (2000) (citing Frances A. McMorris,
Corporate-Spy Case Rebounds on Bristol, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at B5). This has led
some commentators to question the EEA’s effectiveness, especially in a prosecution for
substantive crimes. See, e.g., Dennis J. Kelly & Paul R. Mastrocola, The Economic
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The defendants claimed that only a less restrictive
protective order would permit them to prepare an effective
200
defense.
In granting the defense’s request, the district court
noted the tension between the requirements of the EEA and
certain constitutional provisions:
[I]f . . . we deny to the defendants complete access to
the . . . technology, we inhibit their constitutional right
to effective cross-examination as well as their right to
have a jury . . . determine whether a “trade secret”
exists . . . . [I]f we grant the defendants complete access
to the . . . technology, we impair the very purpose of the
EEA. When faced with such a choice, . . . “the
constitution . . . must govern.”
Therefore, while we recognize that the . . . technology
documents require some measure of protection, we
cannot give them a perfect shield without violating the
defendants’ . . . rights under the Fifth and Sixth
201
Amendments.
The government appealed to the Third Circuit, which
avoided this issue by finding that the defendants were charged
only with inchoate crimes: attempt and conspiracy to violate
202
§ 1832. The Third Circuit held that since impossibility is not a
defense to either an attempt or conspiracy charge under the

Espionage Act of 1996, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 181, 190 (2000):
[T]he requirement to prove the existence of a trade secret under the EEA
and the attendant possibility of “graymail” raises a serious issue concerning
the feasibility and efficacy of EEA prosecutions. If a victim company
ultimately is going to be forced to disclose its trade secrets, it may be
disinclined to refer a trade secret theft to the government or to cooperate
with the prosecution if the government initiates an EEA case by means of
other sources. . . . [R]estrictions imposed by the court on the use and
disclosure of the trade secret information by the defendants may mitigate
this problem somewhat, but certainly not to the extent a defendant actually
goes to trial.
Id. See also Chris Carr, Jack Morton & Jerry Furniss, The Economic Espionage Act: Bear
Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 189–90 (2000).
200. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1023.
201. Id. at 1025 (citing Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 178, 2 L.Ed.
60 (1803)).
202. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 198–99 n. 15; see also supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing
attempt and conspiracy).
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203

EEA, the defendants had no constitutional right of access to
documents that would indicate whether they had, in fact, sought
204
to purchase a trade secret.
So far, no reported cases address the issue left unaddressed
by the Third Circuit, that is, the extent to which a court can
shield proprietary information in a prosecution for commission
205
of a substantive EEA offense.
Commentators generally
conclude that the Hsu district court was correct—that there is a
fundamental, unresolvable tension between a defendant’s
constitutional right to discovery in a substantive prosecution
206
under the EEA and the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1835. Many
believe this creates a continuing disincentive for companies to
report being the victims of economic espionage, a disincentive
207
which erodes the efficacy of the EEA.
Even if we were to assume, for purposes of analysis, that the
Hsu district court and the commentators are wrong and a court
can protect trade secret information implicated in an EEA
prosecution, there are other factors that can discourage
companies from reporting EEA crimes. For example, publicly
announcing that a trade secret has been compromised can
negatively affect a company’s stock value. A 2001 empirical
analysis of the twenty-three EEA prosecutions that had been
brought to that point found that “public disclosures of trade
secret theft are on average associated with a negative stock
market response that is both statistically and economically

203. See supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing attempt and conspiracy).
204. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 201.
205. It is settled that an essential element of a substantive prosecution is the
defendant’s appropriating an actual trade secret. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 312
F.3d 263, 264–65 (7th Cir. 2002).
206. See supra note 196; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text. Section
1835 was included in the EEA to preserve the confidentiality of trade secret information
implicated in an EEA prosecution. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, H.R. REP.
NO. 104-788, at 14 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4033. Congress
recognized that “[w]ithout such a provision, owners may be reluctant to cooperate in
prosecutions for fear of further exposing their trade secrets to public view, thus further
devaluing or even destroying their worth.” Id. at 13.
207. See supra note 199; see also ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
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208

significant.” The study concluded the following:
enough of a track record [exists] to formulate a
tentative progress report regarding the Act. . . . [O]ne of
the fears surrounding the passage of the EEA was that
publicly traded companies might be hesitant to report
the theft of their trade secrets to the government for
fear that doing so might adversely affect their stock
prices. At least at this point, our findings suggest that
this concern has merit, i.e., the stock market and
209
investors care.
They also noted that their findings “raise the important
practical question of why an agency should divert and allocate
scarce budget resources toward a law enforcement mechanism
210
that victims may have little incentive to use.”
A related issue is the likelihood of effective prosecution.
“[P]rior to the passage of the EEA, the prevailing wisdom was
that existing . . . laws, not to mention the extraterritoriality and
enforcement issues, made it virtually impossible to effectively
211
prosecute foreign economic espionage.” The EEA addressed
these issues by adding new crimes to the federal criminal code
and by authorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction over EEA
212
violations. Unfortunately, the EEA did not, and indeed could
not, resolve all of the problems that arise in pursuing foreign
nationals who misappropriate U.S. trade secrets. Perhaps the
most difficult issue is extradition. As noted earlier, economic
espionage is by definition state-sponsored crime in that trade
213
secrets are stolen at the behest of a foreign sovereign. Those
responsible for such thefts are therefore likely to be foreign
nationals who are not in the United States when they are
charged with violating the EEA, either because they left the
country after committing a traditional act of economic espionage
208. Carr & Gorman, supra note 23, at 50 (emphasis in the original).
209. Id. at 51–52. The Annual Report submitted to Congress for 2004 reached a
similar conclusion. See ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at x (“US firms have . . .
been reluctant to raise alarms about possible technology theft out of concern for the
potential impact on investor and consumer confidence and stock prices.”).
210. Carr & Gorman, supra note 23, at 52.
211. Id. at 28 (citing Carr, Morton & Furniss, supra note 199, at 168–70).
212. See supra subpart III.A.2.
213. See supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing the § 1831 offense).
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214

or because they committed the crime remotely, via cyberspace.
In either event, the Department of Justice cannot proceed with
prosecution unless and until it is able to extradite the offender
215
from the country that is harboring him.
An EEA case involving two “firsts” suggests extradition will
not be forthcoming in these cases. In the first prosecution under
216
18 U.S.C. § 1831,
Japan refused to extradite one of the
defendants, a Japanese scientist accused of stealing genetic
materials from the Cleveland Clinic Foundation to benefit
RIKEN, the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research funded
217
The Japanese court charged
by the Japanese government.
with deciding whether the scientist would be extradited found
that there was no probable cause to believe he had acted with
218
the intent to benefit RIKEN, “his new employer.” It was “the
first time in the 24-year history of the Japan-U.S. extradition
219
treaty that Japan has refused to extradite a fugitive.” Since
there is no appeal from the Japanese court’s decision, the denial
220
effectively ended the prosecution. The result in this case seems
221
to be anything but an aberration.
The individual and combined effect of the systemic factors
discussed above is to erode the EEA’s effectiveness as a weapon
against economic espionage. It is a solution in promise, but not
in fact. The next subpart examines contextual factors that
further undermine the EEA’s utility as a means of discouraging
economic espionage.

214. See supra subpart II.B.
215. See, e.g., Morimoto, supra note 60, at 288.
216. See supra subpart III.B.1.
217. See, e.g., Morimoto, supra note 60; see also Mangels, supra note 172.
218. Morimoto, supra note 60.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See, e.g., Srodes, supra note 168, at 12 (“[S]ix years [after enactment of the
EEA], there have only been a few dozen indictments and prosecutions and many of the
accused have high-tailed it back to their home countries where their governments refuse
to extradite them.”).
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Context

In adopting the EEA, Congress chose to approach economic
espionage as a type of crime, to be investigated and prosecuted
using the methods we use for other, more traditional types of
222
crime. What Congress did not anticipate was that the EEA
came into existence at a time when crime, in all its guises, was
about to undergo a radical transformation—one that has
significant consequences for our ability to combat it effectively
223
As the Parts
with traditional law enforcement strategies.
below explain, crime is increasingly migrating online, into
cyberspace. This shift, in the context in which criminal activity
occurs, requires that we re-think how we deal with crime,
including economic espionage.
Order
Crime threatens social order, and societies must maintain a
224
baseline of internal order if they are to endure. Societies use

222. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034, 4034–35 (statement by President William J. Clinton upon signing
H.R. 3723).
This legislation makes the theft or misappropriation of trade secrets a
Federal crime . . . . Trade secrets are an integral part of virtually every
sector of our economy and are essential to maintaining the health and
competitiveness of critical industries operating in the United States.
Economic espionage and trade secret theft threaten our Nation’s national
security and economic well-being.
Until today, Federal law has not accorded appropriate or adequate protection
to trade secrets, making it difficult to prosecute thefts involving this type of
information. . . .
This Act will protect the trade secrets of all businesses operating in the
United States . . . from economic espionage and trade secret theft and deter
and punish those who would intrude into, damage, or steal from computer
networks. I am pleased to sign it into law.
Id.
223. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace:
Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2, 6–11 (2004) [hereinafter Brenner,
Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace].
224. Id. at 8–10.
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225

rules to maintain order. “A rule is a compulsory principle that
governs action and inaction; [it] specifies which actions are
226
allowable and which are not.” Societies use two types of rules
227
to maintain order: constitutive and proscriptive (criminal).
Civil constitutive rules define the structure of a society by
defining relationships among those who comprise that society;
they also allocate essential tasks among the members of the
228
society and ensure that the tasks are performed.
Historically, societies have been bounded systems situated
in a delimited spatial area and composed of a defined populace
(for example, “the people of Rome”). These constraints facilitate
the operation of the constitutive rules. Spatial and demographic
isolation make it easier to socialize members of a society so that
most members accept and abide by its constitutive rules; they
229
also make it easier to identify and suppress those who do not.
Because societies are composed of intelligent entities who
can ignore rules, they cannot rely only on constitutive rules to
230
maintain order. Societies, therefore, implement a second set of
231
These
rules—”criminal rules”—which target rule-violators.
rules impose criminal (proscriptive) liability and sanctions upon
232
those who do not abide by constitutive rules. Societies assume
that sanctioning rule-violators maintains order by preventing
violations. This basic assumption incorporates two subordinate
assumptions: (i) sanctions deter violations by presenting us with
a simple choice—obey rules or suffer the consequences, and (ii)
233
rule-violators will be identified, apprehended, and sanctioned.
For purposes of analysis, we will assume the validity of the
first assumption, as our concern is with the second assumption.
Under the second assumption, if criminal rules are to maintain

225. Id.
226. Id. at 6.
227. Id. at 21, 34.
228. Id. at 17–18, 36–40.
229. See id. at 49–52, 58–60.
230. Id. at 39–41.
231. See id. at 41–42.
232. Id. at 43.
233. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 7 (1967).
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order, there must be a system in place that ensures ruleviolators are identified, apprehended, and sanctioned. There
must be a credible threat of retaliation for violating criminal
rules; absent such a threat, they cannot discourage deviance and
maintain order. For most of human history, societies relied upon
234
citizens to maintain this threat. That began to change in 1829
235
when Sir Robert Peel created the London Metropolitan Police.
The Metropolitan Police was something new: an independent
agency staffed by full-time professionals whose sole task was to
maintain order by reacting to crimes and apprehending the
236
Peel’s model spread around the world, the
perpetrators.
consequence being that in the twenty-first century, we, as
237
citizens, assume no responsibility for maintaining order. That
is the sole province of professionalized police forces that ensure
238
order by reacting to completed crimes.
Real-World Crime
Because real-world crime occurs in a physical environment,
it has four characteristics that are relevant to this discussion:
239
proximity, scale, physical constraints, and patterns. Perhaps
the most fundamental characteristic of real-world crime is that
the perpetrator and victim are physically proximate to each
other when the offense is committed or attempted. For instance,
it is not possible to rape or realistically attempt to rape someone
if the rapist and the victim are fifty miles apart. In a
nontechnological world, it is physically impossible to pick
someone’s pocket, rob them, or defraud them out of their
234. See id. at 59–65.
235. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1202–1203
(1998–1999).
236. Id. at 1202–04.
237. See, e.g., William D. Eggers & John O’Leary, The Beat Generation:
Community Policing at Its Best, 74 POL’Y REV. 1 (1995), available at
http://www.policyreview.org/fall95/thegg.html.
238. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 34 (2001) (assuming crime control “must be a
specialist, professional task of •law enforcement’”).
239. The analysis in this subpart is taken from Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law
for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at 49–57.
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property if the thief and victim are in different cities, states or
countries.
The scale of real-world crime is limited: It tends to be one-toone crime, involving one perpetrator and one victim. The crime
begins with the victimization of the target and ends when the
victimization is concluded. During the event, the perpetrator
focuses all of her attention on consummating that crime; when it
is complete, she can move onto another crime and another
victim. Like proximity, the one-to-one character of real-world
crime derives from the constraints physical reality imposes upon
human activity: A thief cannot pick more than one pocket at a
time; a forger cannot forge more than one document at a time;
and prior to the rise of firearms. It was very difficult for one to
cause the simultaneous deaths of more than one person. Realworld crime, therefore, tends to be serial crime.
Real-world crime is also subject to the physical constraints
that govern activity in the physical world. Every crime, even
street-level drug dealing or prostitution, requires a level of
preparation, planning, and implementation if it is to succeed. A
bank robber must visit the bank to familiarize herself with its
layout, security, and routine; this exposes her to public scrutiny
and that can lead to her being identified and apprehended.
While in the bank, she leaves trace evidence and is subject to
observations that can result in her being identified. As she flees
after committing the robbery, she is again exposed to public
view and risks being identified. In addition to these obvious
risks, she probably had to secure a weapon and a disguise before
the robbery and needed help disposing of the cash afterward.
Each step takes time and effort, which incrementally augments
the exertion required to commit the crime and increases the
risks involved in its commission.
Finally, over time it becomes possible to identify the general
contours and incidence of the real-world crimes committed in a
society. Victimization tends to fall into demographic and
geographic patterns for two reasons. First, only a small segment
of a functioning society’s populace will persistently engage in
criminal activity. Those who fall into this category are apt to be
from economically deprived backgrounds and reside in areas
that share geographic and demographic characteristics. They
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will be inclined to focus their efforts on those with whom they
share a level of physical proximity because they are convenient
victims; consequently, much of a society’s routine crime will be
concentrated in identifiable areas. Second, each society has a
repertoire of crimes—rules that proscribe behaviors ranging
from more to less serious in terms of the harm each inflicts.
Theft causes a loss of property; murder causes a loss of life, and
so on. In a society that is successfully maintaining internal
order, the more egregious crimes will occur much less often and
less predictably than minor crimes.
These characteristics shaped the crime-control strategy
incorporated in the current model of law enforcement. Proximity
contributed a presumed dynamic: victim-perpetrator proximity
and consequent victimization; perpetrator efforts to flee the
crime scene and otherwise evade apprehension; investigation;
identification; and apprehension of the perpetrator. The
dynamic reflects a time when crime was parochial, when victims
and perpetrators tended to live in the same village or
neighborhood. If a victim and perpetrator did not know each
other, they were likely to share community ties that facilitated
identification and apprehension. Thus, there was a good chance
a perpetrator could be identified by witnesses or reputation. If a
perpetrator and a victim did not share community ties, he would
“stand out” as someone who did not belong, which would likely
contribute to his being apprehended. Law enforcement dealt
effectively with this type of crime because its spatial limitations
mean investigations were limited in scope. The strategy still
assumes that the investigation of a crime should focus on the
physical scene of the crime.
The crime-control strategy assumes one-to-one victimization
that, along with another assumption, yields the proposition that
the scale of crime will be limited in a functioning society. The
other assumption is that crimes are extraordinary events—that
law-abiding conduct is the norm and crime is unusual. This
second assumption derives not from the physical characteristics
of real-world crime, but from the need to maintain order. A
society’s constitutive and proscriptive rules work together to
achieve this; the constitutive rules define the acceptable
behaviors that are encouraged, while the proscriptive rules
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emphasize that certain behaviors will not be tolerated.
Individuals are socialized to accept the constitutive rules as
prescribing the correct standards of behavior. Proscriptive rules
reinforce this by emphasizing that the behaviors they condemn
are not only bad, but they are unusual, extraordinary, and
outside the norm. The combined effect of these rules is that
crime becomes a subset, generally a small subset, of the total
behaviors in a society. The limited incidence of criminal
behavior, coupled with one-to-one victimization as the default
crime mode, means law enforcement personnel can focus their
efforts on a limited segment of the conduct within a given
society.
The crime-control strategy also incorporates the concept that
crime falls into patterns, and that it will be limited in incidence
and in the types of harms it inflicts. It also assumes that an
identifiable percentage of crime will occur in geographically and
demographically demarcated areas. The combined effects of
localized crime and the differential frequency with which
various crimes are committed gives law enforcement the ability
to concentrate its resources in areas where crime is most likely
to occur, which enhances its ability to react to completed crimes.
Online Crime
Online crime, or cybercrime, is illegal activity that involves
240
the use of computer technology.
Unlike real-world crime,
cybercrime does not require any degree of physical proximity
between victim and perpetrator for the consummation of an
241
offense. The victim and perpetrator can be in different cities,
states or countries; all a cybercriminal needs is a computer
linked to the Internet.
Furthermore, one-to-one victimization is not typical of
cybercrime: Unlike real-world crime, online crime can be
automated, which means perpetrators can commit thousands of
240. See Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing As Virtual Crime?, 4 CAL. CRIM.
L. REV.1, ¶ 3 (2001), available at http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm [hereinafter
Brenner, Is There Such a Thing As Virtual Crime?].
241. The analysis in this subpart is also taken from Brenner, Toward a Criminal
Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at 65–74.
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crimes quickly and with little effort. One-to-many victimization
is the default assumption for cybercrime. Under the strategy
outlined in subpart III.B.2 (Real-World Crime), officers react to
a crime by investigating and apprehending its perpetrator; the
strategy assumes crime is committed on a limited scale so
officers can react to discrete crimes. Cybercrime violates this
assumption in two ways. First, although cybercrime is carried
out by a small percentage of the population, this relatively small
group can commit crimes on a scale far surpassing what they
could achieve in the real-world. The total number of cybercrimes
will therefore exponentially exceed real-world crimes. Second,
cybercrime is added to the real-world crime with which law
enforcement must continue to deal; people will still rape, rob,
and murder in the real-world. These factors combine to create
an overload in that law enforcement’s ability to react to
cybercrime erodes because the resources that were minimally
adequate to deal with real-world crime are totally inadequate to
deal with cybercrime-plus-real-world-crime.
Cybercriminals also avoid the physical constraints that
govern real-world crime; funds can be extracted from a U.S.
bank and moved into offshore accounts with little effort and less
visibility. The reactive strategy is far less effective against
online crime because the reaction usually begins well after the
crime has been successfully concluded and the trail is cold.
Another problem is that since most or all of the conduct involved
in committing the crime occurs in an electronic environment, the
physical evidence, if any, is evanescent and volatile. By the time
police react, evidence may have been destroyed, advertently or
inadvertently. Since perpetrators are seldom present at the
crime scene, assumptions about their having been observed
while preparing for, committing or fleeing from the crime no
longer hold. Indeed, officers may not be able to determine from
where the perpetrator carried out the crime or who he is;
cybercriminals, unlike their real-world counterparts, can enjoy
perfect anonymity or perfect pseudonymity. Even if officers can
identify the perpetrator of a cybercrime, gathering evidence and
apprehending him can be difficult. The country that hosts him
may not regard what he did as illegal and may therefore decline
to extradite him, or there may be no extradition treaty in place
that governs the conduct at issue.
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Finally, we cannot, at least as of yet, identify offenderoffense patterns comparable to those we have for real-world
crime. Several factors account for this. First, cybercrime is not
well documented. Even if agencies track cybercrimes, they tend
not to break them out into separate categories. Cyberfraud, for
example, is usually listed as fraud. Second, it can be difficult to
parse cybercrime into discrete offenses: Is a virus that causes
billions of dollars of damage in many countries one crime,
several crimes or thousands of crimes? The most important
factor, though, is the lack of accurate statistics. Cybercrimes are
often not detected, and if they are detected, many cybercrimes
are not reported to the authorities.
Online Economic Espionage
What is true of generic cybercrime is also increasingly true
of economic espionage. As subpart II.B explained, economic
espionage is increasingly moving online:
Only a few years ago, stealing customer information
was a cumbersome task. One example is Jose Lopez, the
former executive at General Motors, who was indicted
by a federal grand jury in Detroit for allegedly stealing
boxes of confidential and proprietary information in
1993 from General Motors and transferring them to his
new job at Volkswagen. Today, there is . . . no need to
steal boxes of paper documents. The information . . .
is . . . stored on computers. Such information can be
242
instantly sent anywhere in the world via the Internet.
As economic espionage moves online, it takes on the
characteristics of cybercrime and becomes ever-more resistant to
243
traditional law enforcement efforts.
Economic espionage’s resistance to law enforcement efforts
is further exacerbated by a contextual characteristic it does not
share with other types of cybercrime: Economic espionage is
244
state-sponsored crime. In contrast, our current model of law
242. Carr & Gorman, supra note 23, at 31 (notes omitted) (citing Christian Tyler,
The Enemy Within, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 12, 1997, at 1).
243. See supra Parts II.B, III.B.2 (discussing online crime).
244. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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enforcement assumes crime is the local product of individual
effort. This assumption derives from the physical constraints
that govern real-world crime; as explained above, these
constraints become irrelevant when crime, including economic
245
espionage, moves online.
The assumption that crime is the product of individual effort
also derives from the strictures of the real-world. For millennia,
human groups used physical boundaries—territory—to insulate
246
themselves from threats posed by other human groups. With
the rise of nation-states, the concept of territory became fixed;
each nation-state occupied a specific, defined territory and
assumed the responsibility to protect its citizens from internal
247
threats (crime) and external threats (war). The two categories
remained discrete until relatively recently, when technology
began to make physical boundaries irrelevant and to blur the
248
distinction between crime and war.
Economic espionage is
249
often characterized as a type of warfare; while it does not
250
involve a physical attack upon a nation-state’s territory, it
does represent an attack by one sovereign upon the essential
251
interests of another.
Economic espionage is at once “crime” and “not-crime.” Like
crime, it inflicts various types of harm upon members of a
society. Thus, like online theft, economic espionage harms
citizens by diminishing the value of assets they have acquired

245. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing real-world crime).
246. See Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at
106–09.
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited), in
NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE FUTURE OF TERROR, CRIME AND MILITANCY 1–22 (John
Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, eds., 2001).
249. See, e.g., FIALKA, supra note 34, at 90. See also Robert Loring Allen & Erwin
D. Canham, SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE 28 (1960) (“Economic warfare is defined as the
conscious attempt to increase the relative economic, military, and political position of a
country through foreign economic relations.”).
250. DAVID M. ACKERMAN, RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE
OF MILITARY FORCE, Congressional Research Service CRS-1 (Sept. 13, 2001),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6217.pdf (defining “war” as the use or
threatened use of force by one nation-state against another).
251. See supra Part II.
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252

through legitimate means.
However, unlike a conventional
criminal, the perpetrator of economic espionage does not act
solely for personal gain. Economic espionage is analogous to
warfare because at the very least, it represents an attempt to
253
undermine the security and stability of a sovereign nation.
This aspect of economic espionage differentiates it from other
types of crime in ways that alter the context in which law
254
enforcement has traditionally operated.
As noted above, economic espionage, like cybercrime,
increasingly violates the assumption that crime is local. The
perpetrators of economic espionage are often foreign nationals
who either leave the victim-state after misappropriating trade
255
secrets or consummate the act remotely, via cyberspace. They

252. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra note 240,
¶ 32–49.
253. See Michelle Van Cleave, Nat’l Counterintelligence Executive, Remarks at the
st
Century: The National
Conference on Counterintelligence for the 21
Counterintelligence Strategy of the U.S. 5–6 (Mar. 4–5, 2005), http://www.nacic.gov/
publications/reportsspeeches/speeches/CI21Conf/TexasspeechCI.pdf.
America’s national defense rests on its continuing technological
superiority . . . .
Espionage has long proven the most cost-effective means of defeating U.S.
capabilities. We may spend billions of dollars to develop a given weapons
system, the effectiveness of which rests on . . . technological . . . secrets that
give us advantage. If those essential secrets are stolen, both our investments
and our advantage can be lost.
Id. at 5–6.
254. Though economic espionage is, in certain senses, analogous to an act of war, it
is unlikely that countries will treat it as an act of warfare. So far, it is the act of one or
more individuals, rather than the use of military force by another sovereign. See
ACKERMAN, supra note 250. We are accustomed to approaching acts of espionage,
including economic espionage’s more sinister counterparts, as crimes. See, e.g., Henry
Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?: From Korea to Agfhanistan, 29 S.U.L. Rev. 181,
182–85 (2002).
255. See supra note 211 and accompanying text; ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note
10, at 1 (“Increasingly, foreign entities need not even come to the United States to
acquire sensitive technology but, instead, can work within their own borders.”); see, e.g.,
Industrial Spy Arrested in London Probably Worked from Germany, BBC INT’L REPORTS
(Europe), May 31, 2005.
A suspected industrial spy, who was arrested in London last week, probably
worked from Baden-Wuerttemberg. . . . This was reported by the Federal
State Office of Criminal Investigations (LKA) in Stuttgart . . . . The 41-year
old computer expert was reportedly the mastermind of a group that spied on
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are, therefore, not in the victim-state when its law enforcement
officials seek to react to an economic espionage crime by
arresting, prosecuting and sanctioning those responsible.
Nation-states long ago evolved processes for ensuring that
those who flee a jurisdiction after committing conventional
crimes can be returned to face justice. For centuries, countries
have used the process of extradition to return fleeing criminals
256
to the jurisdiction in which they committed their crimes.
Bilateral treaties are the means used to implement extradition;
each party to the treaty agrees to extradite those whom the
state requesting extradition has charged with or convicted of an
257
extraditable offense. Extraditable offenses can be specifically
defined in the treaty or, more often, the treaty will encompass
crimes that are punishable by the laws of both parties with a
258
The nation-state seeking
specific degree of severity.
extradition submits a request, with supporting documents, to
the country harboring the fugitive. If that country grants the
request, it arranges for the fugitive to be surrendered to the
259
country seeking extradition.
260
While it is cumbersome, this process works reasonably
well for conventional crimes because the conduct involved in
261
these crimes threatens the stability of all states. As long as a
state is assured that certain procedural requirements are met, it
will cooperate in seeing that one who fled justice in another
state is returned for prosecution and/or incarceration.
This process is unlikely to work for economic espionage. The

internal information of industrial companies via the Internet.
See id.; see also CY4OR: Tackling the Tactics of Cyber Spies, M2 PRESSWIRE, Sept. 7,
2004.
256. Monica L. McHam, Comment, All’s Well That Ends Well: A Pragmatic Look at
International Criminal Extradition, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 419, 430–31 (1997-1998).
257. Id. at 31; see, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Lithuania, U.S.-Lith. Oct. 23, 2001,
S. TREATY DOC. No. 107-4 (2001).
258. See, e.g., id. art. 2(1).
259. See, e.g., id. arts. 8, 12(3).
260. See, e.g., Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar
Crime: International Challenges and the Legal Tools Available to Address Them, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 235–43 (2002) (discussing a few of the legal and political
hurdles faced during the extradition process).
261. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order and real-world crime).
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conduct involved in economic espionage departs from the
conventional crime model in that it does not threaten the
stability of all nation-states. Economic espionage is predicated
on the emerging dynamic of cross-border victimization. Cross262
border victimization is common in conventional cybercrime,
but it takes on a unique aspect in economic espionage because
the state itself is involved in the crime. Agents of State A
victimize citizens of State B to confer a competitive advantage
upon State A. Since the agents act to benefit State A, neither
they nor their conduct pose a threat to the stability of that state
or to any other state that relies upon scientific and technological
advancements for competitive and tactical advantages. Most
nations, therefore, do not regard economic espionage as a
particularly serious matter. Even the United States “has no
specific national legislation that would prohibit espionage
263
against other nations.”
The effects of this laissez-faire attitude toward economic
espionage are exacerbated by the unique position a requested
state is in when another country, say the United States, seeks
extradition or other assistance in pursuing someone charged
with economic espionage. When conventional crime is involved,
the state from which assistance is requested is, in essence, a
neutral party. That is, while the state may have concerns about
the regularity of the process, it has no stake in the dispute
between the person whom it harbors and the state that seeks
264
assistance. The generic harms encompassed by conventional
265
crimes threaten all states.
The situation is very different when state-sponsored crime is
involved. If the economic espionage was committed for the
benefit of the state from which assistance is requested, it is no
longer a neutral party; it now has a conflict of interest. Assume
the United States asks State A to extradite Suspect X, whom the

262. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online crime).
263. Blood, supra note 58, at 233.
264. When the person is a citizen of the state from which assistance is requested,
that state may approach the request with special care, focusing on issues such as the
penalties that can be imposed and the extent to which the person’s rights will be
protected in any criminal proceedings. See e.g., Snow, supra note 260, at 235–40.
265. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order and real-world crime).
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United States has charged with economic espionage. If the
espionage was undertaken to benefit State A, then State A is the
beneficiary of the crime for which extradition is being sought. If
State A encouraged or otherwise sponsored the crime, it is an
accomplice in the commission of that crime. In either case, it is
in State A’s best interest to decline extradition, if only to limit
publicity concerning its role in the offense. The same conclusion
holds, perhaps to a lesser extent, when assistance is requested
for other purposes, such as evidence-gathering.
While the EEA may be a useful approach to the domestic
266
theft of trade secrets, it is a futile attempt at dealing with
economic espionage—especially online economic espionage. The
next Part considers how we can improve our approach to this
problem.
IV. THE FUTURE
We don’t want to . . . discover, years and years after the
fact, that while we have investigated every reported
267
security breach, spies have stolen our secrets . . . .
The source of the EEA’s futility in dealing with online
economic espionage is its reliance on the reactive model of law
268
enforcement.
Law enforcement’s ability to react effectively to
criminal activity, including economic espionage, erodes
dramatically when that activity moves online. The fundamental,
operational assumptions that structure the reactive model do
269
not apply to online crime. The erosive effects of this failure of
assumptions are exacerbated by state involvement in economic
espionage because the resulting conflicts of interest make it
exceedingly unlikely that the culpable state will render
assistance to a country seeking to bring the perpetrator(s) of
270
economic espionage to justice.

266. See supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing the § 1832 offense).
267. Van Cleave, supra note 253, at 4–5.
268. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online crime and online economic
espionage).
269. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online crime and online economic
espionage).
270. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online economic espionage).
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Logically, we have two alternatives for improving our
271
approach to economic espionage: We can improve the reactive
model of law enforcement’s applicability to online crime,
including economic espionage, or we can implement a different
approach that supplements the reactive model.
A. Improved Reaction
An obvious way to improve law enforcement’s ability to react
to online crime, including economic espionage, is to increase the
number of officers available to react and the resources they
272
utilize in reacting to online crime. However, there are two
problems with this option. First, societies already find it difficult
to allocate the resources needed to support law enforcement
agencies. Therefore, it is improbable that they can summon the
resources needed to recruit, train and equip enough officers to
make the reactive strategy a viable approach to online crime
while retaining its viability for real-world crime. Second, since
online crime is automated, there is no guarantee that simply
increasing the number of officers will improve the efficacy with
which law enforcement can react. Certain factors suggest that
adding officers is unlikely to improve law enforcement reaction.
Since online activity tends to be less visible, economic espionage
273
often goes undetected. Furthermore, since online activity can
be automated, a perpetrator can commit serial acts of economic
espionage while officers are still attempting to react to his initial
effort.

271. For an argument as to how civil liability can be used to this end, see Rustad,
supra note 182.
272. See Susan W. Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law
Enforcement, 9 INT’L J. COMMS. L. & POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 18 (2004), available at
http://www.digital-law.net/IJCLP/Cy_2004/pdf/Brenner_ijlcp-paper.pdf [hereinafter
Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement].
273. See, e.g., Van Cleave, supra note 253, at 6:
The most successful espionage—the kind that goes undetected—is all the
more effective, because what is not known cannot be remedied. And the risks
are growing. The marvels of modern information technology and
microelectronics have revolutionized espionage tradecraft, enabling the
clandestine extraction of vast volumes of data in miniaturized storage media
or across computer networks at the press of a “send” button.

BRENNER FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS

454

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/21/2006 11:29 AM

[Vol. 28:2

Another option is to react differently, by striking back at
those who commit online crime. Writing in a different context,
Professor Reidenberg proposed that nations authorize their law
enforcement officers to use “electronic sanctions” to react to
274
He argued that states could electronically
online crime.
sanction offenders:
[S]tates may electronically sanction rule offenders by
using technologies to penalize or destroy the offenders’
online presence . . . . [A] state might launch a denial of
service . . . attack. This is an online death penalty’ and
prevents an offender from interacting on the [I]nternet.
A state may also use hacking techniques to ‘seize’ or
paralyze rule-violating web pages . . . . [T]he state may
use techniques similar to the MS Blaster worm for law
275
enforcement purposes.
What Professor Reidenberg proposed is an official version of
an alternative that has been discussed for some time: civilian
self-help or strikeback techniques that supplement law
276
enforcement reactions to cybercrime.
However, neither the
official nor the unofficial version of this alternative is an
acceptable solution. Both create a new type of state-sponsored
277
crime,
and the state-sanctioned use of official or private
278
strikeback techniques could be seen as an act of warfare.
A final option for improving the reactive model’s efficacy
against economic espionage is to implement the approach the
Council of Europe has taken in its Convention on Cybercrime
279
(Convention). The Convention is based on the premise that an

274. See Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. &
TECH. J. 213, 228–29 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=487965 (follow
“Document Delivery” hyperlink).
275. Id. at 228 (notes omitted).
276. See, e.g., Curtis E.A. Karnow, Strike and Counterstrike: The Law on
Automated Intrusions and Striking Back, BLACKHAT WINDOWS SECURITY, Feb. 27, 2003,
at 5, http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa-03/bh-win-03-karnow-notes.pdf.
277. Id.; see Reidenberg, supra note 273, at 228–29.
278. See, e.g., Walter G. Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use of Force (1999) (on file with
Author).
279. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm [hereinafter Convention on
Cybercrime].
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international network of consistent substantive and procedural
laws will improve national law enforcement’s ability to react
across jurisdictional borders, which will restore the effectiveness
of the current crime control strategy. To that end, the
Convention seeks to harmonize national laws that define
various types of cybercrime, authorize mutual assistance in
280
evidence-gathering and permit extradition of cybercriminals.
However, the Convention does not encompass economic
281
and it is doubtful that a comparable treaty
espionage,
encompassing economic espionage could be implemented given
282
the state involvement in that activity. Thus, it seems we have
little hope of improving the efficacy of law enforcement reaction
to economic espionage, we must consider alternative
283
approaches.
B. Prevention
There are two ways to deal with crime: react to it or prevent
it. The reactive model of law enforcement discussed above
incorporates prevention insofar as it is seeks to incapacitate and
284
deter offenders; but this is not its primary concern. Prevention
is the primary concern of the community policing model, which
emphasizes police-civilian cooperation to create a climate in
285
which crime is not tolerated. We cannot, for various reasons,
286
apply the community policing model to online crime. We can,
however, use its focus on prevention to develop a more effective
approach to online economic espionage.
Various sources have outlined specific techniques
individuals and industry can use to prevent economic
280. See id. at Explanatory Report ¶¶ 1–16.
281. See id. arts. 2–10.
282. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online economic espionage).
283. Even if we abandon the reactive strategy as our approach to economic
espionage and other types of online crime, we will still need to retain it. It has proven an
effective strategy for real-world crime, and there is no reason to believe that will change.
284. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing real-world crime).
285. See, e.g., Barry N. Leighton, Visions of Community Policing: Rhetoric and
Reality in Canada, 33 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 485, 487 (1991) (on file with Author).
286. For one thing, the concept of a physical community does not translate into
cyberspace. See, e.g., Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law
Enforcement, supra note 272, at 23.
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espionage. This discussion is concerned not with techniques,
but with how we can implement a paradigm shift, to move from
relying exclusively on the reactive model as our strategy for
dealing with economic espionage to a strategy based on
prevention. Basically, there seem to be three possible
implementation strategies.
1.

Implementation Strategies

One implementation strategy is to mandate prevention by
implementing rules that require businesses to protect their
trade secrets and by imposing sanctions upon those that do not
288
comply. However, mandating prevention is a bad idea because,
in effect, it retains the reactive model and adds another layer of
289
enforcement that further stretches already-slim resources. If a
mandatory system is to be effective, someone has to police
enforcement, that is, check to see if specified prevention
measures have been implemented and ensure the imposition of
290
sanctions when they are not.
A second implementation strategy is to continue to do what
we are already doing, that is, make prevention purely
291
voluntary. This strategy is clearly not working.
A third and potentially more promising implementation
strategy is to use civil or criminal liability to create additional
incentives (beyond the economic incentives that already exist
and are obviously not compelling) to prevent economic
espionage. This strategy is analogous to mandated prevention in
that it imposes consequences for not preventing the
misappropriation of trade secrets, but it differs in certain critical
respects. Instead of mandating the implementation of specific
preventative measures, this strategy would simply create a legal
duty to prevent the misappropriation of trade secrets and would

287. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S INFO. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., CYBER SECURITY: A
CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION 37–48 (2005), available at http://www.hpcc.gov/pitac/
reports/20050301_cybersecurity/cybersecurity.pdf.
288. For an analysis of this strategy in a different context, see Brenner, Toward A
Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at 90–94.
289. Id. at 92–93.
290. Id. at 91–93.
291. Id. at 89–90.
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apply to a defined group, presumably those who own and/or
control trade secret information. Those encompassed by the duty
would be under a legal obligation to take reasonable measures to
protect the trade secrets they control.
The virtue of this strategy is that it puts the risk of failure
on those who are in the best position to protect trade secrets. If
they fail, they are held liable, either civilly or criminally, as
explained below. While this approach may seem harsh because
it may seem like blaming the victim, it is in fact a logical way to
go about changing assumptions. Holding the owners of trade
secrets liable for the compromise of their information will make
it clear that they are the first and only line of defense for the
trade secrets they control. If a preventative strategy is to
succeed, owners of trade secrets must understand that it is up to
them to protect that information. In this context we must
eliminate the assumption that the government or law
enforcement is exclusively responsible for maintaining the
security of property. Mandating prevention with specific rules
and enforcement agencies would tend to perpetuate this
assumption because the state would be directing the process.
The state, not the civilian owners of trade secrets, would still be
assuming primary responsibility for protecting property,
although in a slightly different guise. Also, like any regulatory
scheme, mandated prevention could take on a life of its own and
lead owners of trade secrets to focus more on the process, that is,
on what is involved in complying with the rules rather than on
protecting their proprietary information.
We will therefore assume that the best implementation
strategy uses civil or criminal liability to hold those who control
trade secrets liable for the compromise of that information. The
issue we now need to address is the type of liability that should
be imposed.
2.

Liability

The first option is to hold businesses or individuals or both
civilly liable for not preventing the misappropriation of trade
secrets in their possession and control. The obvious problem
with this option is identifying the person who would seek
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redress because civil litigation is initiated by such a person.
We would, therefore, need an injured person, with standing to
293
bring the litigation. Since owners of trade secrets are at once
the victims of the misappropriation and the party to be held
liable for failing to prevent misappropriation, we obviously
cannot rely on them. When a business is involved, we could let
the shareholders bring the suit, but there may be disincentives
294
for them to do so. Another alternative is to let the government
bring suit as a civil enforcement action analogous to civil
295
antitrust enforcement actions.
The second option is to hold individuals or businesses or
both criminally liable for defaulting on their obligation to
prevent the misappropriation of trade secrets. We could not do
this without modifying and extrapolating certain principles of
criminal liability. We would be holding the victim of a crime (the
owner of trade secrets) criminally liable for not preventing
his/her/its own victimization. We would literally be blaming the
victim. We currently conceptualize crime as a zero-sum event in
which the perpetrator bears sole responsibility for the offense.
We do not incorporate victim fault into our crime calculus,
presumably due to the influence of the reactive model of law
296
Under the reactive model, the victim’s fault is
enforcement.
irrelevant because civilians bear no responsibility for preventing
crime. We are entitled and obliged to assume law enforcement
will control crime sufficiently to maintain internal order in the
297
society.
If we wanted to pursue this option, could we eliminate this
assumption without doing violence to our basic approach to
criminal law? Could we articulate a justification for treating
owners of trade secrets differently from, say, owners of

292. 67A C.J.S. Parties § 6 (2005).
th
293. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8 ed. 2004) (defining standing as a “party’s
right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right”).
294. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
295. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 7-5.420,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/5mant.htm.
296. See Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at
85–87.
297. See id at 86–87; supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing real-world crime).
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298

convenience stores?
We could base the justification on the status of economic
espionage as a state-sponsored crime. As noted earlier, economic
299
espionage is an act of economic warfare, which differentiates it
from other types of online crime, including conventional theft. In
conventional theft, the perpetrator acts to benefit himself and,
perhaps, some associates; thus, the crime is intrinsically
300
individual and involves only civilians. The state’s interest in
this type of activity is, therefore, sufficiently vindicated if it is
able to discourage it with the degree of effectiveness necessary
301
to keep it at acceptably low levels within a society.
Economic espionage represents a different dynamic and
therefore requires a different calculus. The perpetrator of
economic espionage directly attacks a civilian victim and, in so
doing, indirectly attacks the state of which that victim is a
302
citizen. Since economic espionage can erode a state’s viability,
states have an enhanced interest in this type of criminal
activity, one that goes beyond discouraging the activity with an
303
efficacy sufficient to maintain a baseline of internal order.
304
Criminal law evolved to address only the latter interest. We
therefore have principles of criminal law that address the harm
305
but lack principles that would
to the individual victim,
encompass the harm to the state and provide the predicate for
redressing that harm.
Such a principle must recognize that economic espionage
inflicts harm both upon the individual victim and upon the

298. We need a principled justification to distinguish the two because we will
retain the reactive model of law enforcement for other types of crime. See supra note 283.
299. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
300. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing As Virtual Crime?, supra note 240, ¶ 23.
301. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order).
302. See ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at 1 (“The . . . ability of foreign
entities to acquire . . . US technology . . . has undermined US national security by
enabling foreign firms to push aside US businesses in the marketplace and by eroding
the US military lead.”).
303. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order).
304. Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at 35–46.
305. See, e.g., Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra note 240,
¶ 40 (discussing theft offenses as a means of redressing harm resulting from loss of
individual property); see also supra subpart III.A.1.

BRENNER FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS

460

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/21/2006 11:29 AM

[Vol. 28:2

state. The harm to the individual victim is the loss in the value
306
of the compromised trade secret. Conceptually, the harm to
the individual victim is a mixture of theft (the victim loses part
of the value of its property) and property damage (the property
307
is worth less than it was before). We do not have a vocabulary
that can describe the harm to the state because we are
accustomed to thinking of crime as a civilian matter in which
one citizen harms another. The state’s only interest is to control
this activity with an efficacy sufficient to maintain internal
308
order.
309
Crime is, and will remain, a primarily civilian matter.
What we need to realize, though, is that in an era of modern
transportation and computer technology, crime is not exclusively
a civilian matter. Conduct that falls within our conception of
traditional varieties of crime can also inflict harm upon the
state, and we need to be able to address this distinct,
310
incremental harm. To do that, we need to be able to articulate
why the misappropriation of trade secrets inflicts discrete harms
upon the individual owner and the state in which the owner is a
citizen. To do that, we need to assess the nature of the property
311
at issue in light of the concerns addressed above.
Unlike the funds in the cash drawer of a convenience store,
a trade secret cannot be considered purely private property.
Trade secret data, like other types of information, has become
306. See supra subpart III.A.1.
307. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra note 240, ¶ 44–
47. Misappropriation of a trade secret is analogous to theft in that the perpetrator takes
something from the victim. In that sense, it is analogous to other intellectual property
crimes, such as copyright. See, e.g., Geoffrey Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms?
Unauthorized Music Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733 (2005).
Misappropriation of trade secrets is also analogous to property damage crimes like
vandalism in that the victim still has its property, i.e., the trade secret, but it is now
damaged goods. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra note 240, ¶
71 (discussing cyber crime as analogous to vandalism in that another’s property is still in
their possession, but is damaged).
308. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order).
309. See Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at
31–49.
310. See generally Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving away from Reactive Law
Enforcement supra note 272, at 34–35.
311. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online economic espionage).
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part of our critical national infrastructure.
It is therefore
reasonable to conceptualize trade secrets as a new type of mixed
property: information that belongs both to its civilian owner(s)
313
and to the state. Each has a distinct interest in the property:
The owner’s primary interest is in utilizing the trade secret for
commercial purposes; the state’s primary interest is in seeing
that the trade secret’s value is not compromised by losing its
314
status as a secret. With this mixed concept of trade-secrets-asproperty, we can address both the harm to the individual
owner(s) and the harm to the state. Addressing the latter
requires implementing rules that hold the owners of trade
secrets criminally liable, perhaps in varying degrees, for not
315
preventing their misappropriation.
The gravamen of such
liability is not the individual owner’s loss, but the erosion of the
commercial, tactical, and/or other advantages that accrued to
316
the state from the information’s remaining secret.
The imposition of liability as hypothesized above is not as
Draconian as it may sound. More than a century ago, American
criminal law began to use regulatory offenses to create “forward317
looking incentives yielding socially optimal outcomes.” While
312. Presidential
Decision
Directive
NSC-63
(May
22,
1998),
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm; see ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10,
at 1–2; Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement,
supra note 271, at 35.
313. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online economic espionage).
314. These interests are not completely discrete. The owner also has an interest in
seeing that the secrecy of the information is not compromised, and the state has an
indirect interest in seeing that it is utilized for commercial purposes.
315. For the implementation of an analogous type of criminal liability, see Brenner,
Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement, supra note 272, at
34–36 (discussing criminal product liability for software manufacturers).
316. The premise of such liability is analogous to that imposed in criminal
antitrust proceedings:
In a traditional criminal proceeding, the state acts to vindicate its obligation
to protect a member of the social system it represents. In a criminal antitrust
enforcement proceeding, the state acts to vindicate its obligation to protect
essential components of the system. The “harm” caused by an antitrust
“crime” is an erosion of the principle of competition. Criminal antitrust
proceedings therefore target “systemic” crimes, i.e., crimes that impact upon
a nation’s infrastructure instead of upon individuals . . . .
Id. at 35 (notes omitted).
317. Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction
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the commission of a regulatory offense does result in the
imposition of criminal liability, regulatory offenses differ from
traditional crimes in several important respects. Like the
liability hypothesized above, they target systemic harms instead
318
of the imposition of a specific harm on an individual. Since the
goal is to create incentives to engage in certain socially-desirable
conduct, they often target a failure to act where the law imposes
319
a duty to act. Also, conviction of a regulatory offense of the
type proposed above does not carry the moral stigma or severe
penalties that are associated with conviction of a traditional,
320
common law crime like rape or murder.
The primary difference between the criminal liability
proposed above and the regulatory offenses we currently have is
that the proposed liability blames the victim. It holds
individuals and entities criminally liable because they failed to
prevent their own victimization. The regulatory offenses that
exist essentially impose liability for not preventing the
occurrence of conditions that (i) create the potential for
generalized harms, such as threats to public health and safety,
or (ii) result in the occurrence of specified systemic harms such
321
as environmental damage. Thus, they sanction violators either
for inflicting or creating conditions that can inflict external
harm, that is, harm directed at someone other than the violator.
For the reasons noted above, we have not yet sanctioned those
who create conditions that produce internal harm, that is, the
322
victimization of the violator.
The difference between the two types of regulatory offenses
is that the criminal liability proposed above is intended to target
a type of activity distinct from the activities encompassed by our
Of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 142
(1996).
318. See id; see also Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive
Law Enforcement, supra note 272, at 34–36.
319. See Seidman, supra note 317, at 142; see also Brenner, Distributed Security:
Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement, supra note 272, at 36.
320. Seidman, supra note 317, at 142–43; see also Brenner, Distributed Security:
Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement, supra note 272, at 37.
321. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. FMC
Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
322 See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text.
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current repertoire of regulatory offenses. The current set of
regulatory offenses may be based on a different rationale than
the rationale responsible for traditional crimes, but it has the
same focus on undesirable activity occurring within the
territorial boundaries of a society. When the locus of both the
perpetrator and the harm is within the territorial boundaries of
a state, a regulatory offense can be predicated upon the
structure and assumptions we have traditionally utilized for
crime. It can incorporate the reactive model, which focuses on
sanctioning the person who inflicted the harm at issue in a
particular offense, and the basic dynamic—offender, harm,
reaction, sanction—can apply.
The criminal liability hypothesized above is intended to
address a different scenario: undesirable state-sponsored
activity that transcends the territorial boundaries of the society
in which the harm occurs. Since the reactive model cannot deal
effectively with this type of criminal activity, we must shift
focus. If we cannot deter external actors from misappropriating
our trade secrets, we must motivate the internal actors who
control trade secrets to secure them and prevent their being
misappropriated. The only way we can use criminal liability to
this end is to reconceptualize the crime of economic espionage so
that it has two components: (i) the conventional crime (economic
espionage) which a state-sponsored agent commits against an
owner of trade secrets, and (ii) the regulatory offense which the
owner of trade secrets commits by not preventing the
misappropriation of his/her/its proprietary information.
Parsing economic espionage into these analytically-distinct
components gives us an equitable way to use criminal liability to
implement a focused paradigm shift that emphasizes
prevention, not reaction, as the strategy we employ to protect
trade secrets. We apply an attenuated level of criminal liability
in the form of a regulatory offense to the person who is
responsive to the reactive model, that is, the domestic owner of
trade secrets. This attenuated liability is based on existing
principles of criminal law. By not preventing the
misappropriation of trade secrets, the owner of those secrets
contributes to the commission of economic espionage. In a
harsher mode, we hold those who contribute to the commission
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323

of a crime liable as accomplices to that offense. Here, we apply
a much narrower principle: The owner is held liable not as an
accomplice to the completed crime, but for the separate and
distinct offense of failing to institute security measures
324
sufficient to prevent the theft of trade secrets.
C. Sum
The strategy articulated immediately above may seem
nothing more than a reiteration of the reactive model of law
enforcement. Concededly, like that model, it encompasses a
reaction to a crime—theft of trade secrets—and the consequent
imposition of criminal liability. There is, however, a critical
difference between the two. The current approach, as embodied
in the EEA, is based on the assumptions that (i) law
enforcement can react effectively to the compromise of trade
secret information by agents of a foreign state, and (ii) a
presumptively effective reaction will discourage such future
attacks sufficiently to protect the security of trade secrets.
Earlier Parts of this Article demonstrate that neither
assumption is viable given that economic espionage is statesponsored crime and is increasingly transnational in character.
The strategy articulated in subpart IV.B does not encompass
either of these assumptions. It is based on a very different logic.
It assumes that the best way to protect our trade secrets is to
ensure that those who have possession and control of them take
reasonable efforts to prevent their being compromised. Thus, its
focus is on the owners of trade secrets (potential victims), not on
those who seek to compromise trade secrets (potential
criminals). It also assumes, for the reasons noted earlier, that a
purely voluntary system of preventing the theft of trade secrets
is likely to be ineffective, at least for the foreseeable future. This
approach imposes criminal liability not in an attempt to deter
the commission of crimes, but in an effort to create a climate in

323. See, e.g., Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law
Enforcement, supra note 271, at 30–33.
324. For the implementation of an analogous type of criminal liability, see id. at
38–39.
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which those who control trade secrets understand that they are
the only ones who can prevent the compromise of that
information.

